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ABSTRACT
Psychology as well as education has generally been dealing until now
with human beings in a one at a time relationship between individuals and
their environment. Many contemporary schools have acknowledged the lack
of representativeness this relationship explores. But only a few scientists
have tried to change the pattern. One of them was Egon Brunswik (1905-1955)
who introduced some new concepts in the Behavioral Sciences. Brunswik*
s
activities were in the fields of ecology, history of science, perception and
psychological design.
The major purpose of this study was to analyze Brunswik* s new
methodological and theoretical approaches to the relationship between the
organism and the environment. Three different levels of analysis have been
viii
involved: (1) a comparative level in which the Brunswik approach is compared
with other systems; (2) an adaptive level in which the Brunswik approach is
translated into present language terms for the sake of a better modem
appreciation; and (3) an evaluative level in which the Brunswik approach is
weighted in terms of its implication for Philosophy of Science, psychological
design and today’s problems in education.
The study was organized as follows: (1) an Introductory Chapter that
describes the main features of the study approach; (2) a Chapter that describes
Brunswik's background and some of his biographical data; (3) a Chapter that
considers three leading Brunswik concepts (a) a conceptual framework that is
conceived to handle the complexity of behavior without reduction of
methodological rigor; (b) the conceptual development of functionalism as a
means of studying the dynamic unity of mental phenomena related to the
adaption of the organism to its environment; and (c) a comparative analysis of
psychological systems. These three leading points are developed within the
rubric of the "regional reference; " (4) a Chapter that describes the study of
the environment within the framework of probabilistic functionalism which
stresses the so-called vicarious functioning in behavioral achievement;
(5) a Chapter that studies the nature of the organism and the lens model
in
which are expressed some of the most important Brunswikian features such
as ecological validity, the utilization of cues, and functional validity; (6) a
chapter that analyzes Brunswik’s main methodological issue, the comparative
ix
value of systematic design versus representative design which followed from
Brunswik’s concern for the universe of situations in the natural habitat that
would need to be considered in order that any study be representative of
the probabilistic nature of environmental circumstances of any organism of
interest. The last Chapter that evaluates the educational relevance of
Brunswik’s principles in terms of the basic needs in modem educational
research: (a) the lack in education of established relationships with other
behavioral sciences, and (b) the need in such fields as teaching, learning,
thinking, etc.
,
for a new conception of the metatheoretical analysis,
i. e.
,
a metatheory concerned with the development, investigation or
description of theory itself.
A critical description of the psychological and educational terms used
in this Dissertation is included as Appendix.
x
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Psychology as well as education has had a history of dealing with
human beings in a restricted way, i.e.
,
in a one at a time relationship
between individuals and their environment. All contemporary schools have
dealt more or less with the problem of how representative was this relation-
ship. But a few scientists have tried to change the pattern in an intelligent
and imaginative manner. One of them was Egon Brunswik (1905-1955) who
introduced some new concepts in the Behavioral Sciences. Nevertheless,
Brunswik has been poorly understood though it can be argued that his relevant
studies in ecology, history of science, perception as well as in the field of
experimental design deserve a better knowledge and utilization. It is also
important to evaluate whether Brunswik’s conceptualizations and methods
are suitable for application in the field of Educational Psychology.
Purpose of the study
The work with Brunswik is projected to be on three different levels:
2U comparative Analysis Level. This level makes a comprehensive
summarization and analysis of the works and historical background of the
Brunswik approach itself as well as its relationship with other related systems.
2. Adaptive Level. This level translates into present language
Brunswik's terms and concepts as well as ideology. In other words, it is
desired to make accessible to current practitioners the main points involved
in Brunswik’s thought. To help to do this, a vocabulary of psychological and
educational terms thought necessary for understanding the contents of the
study is presented.
Evaluative Level. This level makes an analysis of the value and
richness of the Brunswik system at least in terms of:
a. its implications in Philosophy of Science
b. its implication in psychological design
c. its potential application into the day to day
problems in education.
Organization of the study
For fulfilling the described project the work has been organized into
Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter II: Description of Brunswik' s background and some
Biographical data.
3Chapter III ; Considerations and main points implied in Brunswik's
probabilistic functionalism.
These include:
a. The study of the following three leading attitudes in
Brunswik's system:
1. Brunswik was looking for a conceptual framework
which could handle the full complexity of behavior
without sacrifice of methodological rigor.
2. Brunswik was convinced that the conceptual
developments in psychology showed a gradual and
inevitable convergence towards functionalism (the
philosophical and psychological doctrine that
considers—since William James—mental phenomena
in their dynamic unity as a system of functions
directed to adapting the organism to its environment).
3. Brunswik thought that such a functionalism is better
understood within a comparative analysis of
psychological systems.
b. The study of the Psychological systems in terms of the
so-called "Regional Reference" in which are also analyzed
the following organism-environment relationships:
41. An organism and its surroundings provides the
conditions and supports for the organism behavior-
causal texture.
2. The environment is divided in "regions." The
"regions" can be referred to as either physical
features and events which are considered as
antecedent conditions in the analysis of behavior or
the regions can be considered to represent reactions
of the organism and their effects on the environment.
3. The psychological analysis may focus on events
located at a "central," "proximal" and "distal"
distance from the organism.
c. The study of the Historical Reference:
Brunswik was particularly interested in the argument that
the historical development of psychological systems is characterized
by an increasing degree of the so-called "distal reference. " Brunswik
points out that classical psychophysics were concerned with the
relationship between proximal stimulation and perceived sensation,
the inferred response in the central state of the organism. In the
same way introspective analysis of central states was based on the
assumption that there exists a strict one-to-one relationship between
verbal statements and inner central or peripheral proximal events.
5And in a similar way he suggested that the "gestalt" approach
distorted this relationship (the central state was treated as a response
to the total sensory configuration) as did classical behaviorism that
continued to define the stimulus in proximal terms.
For Brunswik, the "distal" reference emerges from two connected
studies. On the one side, the studies on perceptual-constancy shows that
the organism can maintain a stable perceptual environment in spite of
variations in proximal mediation. On the other side, the study of "molar"
behaviorism represented mainly by Tolman’s work in which the representative
features are:
1. A description of behavior not in molecular but in molar terms.
2. All behavior is seen as purposive.
3. The individual learns not sequences of movements but
expectation sets.
4. Reinforcement is replaced by the principle of confirmation.
Chapter IV : The study of the environment in the framework of the
probabilistic functionalism.
This involves:
1. The parallel analysis of perceptual and behavioral
achievement within a unitary conceptual framework.
2. The assessment of the organism’s achievements in
adjusting to an environment which remains to an important
degree unpredictable.
6An important emphasis on the so-called "vicarious
functioning"
—the mediation of perceptual and behavioral
achievements by multiple and interchangeable processes.
Chapter V : The study of the nature of the organism and of the lens
model.
Assessed are:
!• The ecological validity. The presence of a given distal
property doesn't imply a specific, predictable pattern of
proximal effects. Thus it is not possible with certainty
to infer the nature of the distal variable from a specific
pattern of proximal stimulation. What defines the
ecological validity is the degree of association between
a proximal cue and a distal property of the proximal cue
with respect to that property.
2. The utilization of cues. Confronted with cues of limited
validity the organism is forced to adopt a "probabilistic
strategy. " To determine this it must make an independent
determination of the ecological validity of different proximal
cues and insure the real value given to these cues by the
organism.
73. Functional validity. The relationship between distal
variable and perceptual response measures the degree of
the organism’s perceptual achievement. Thus the degree
of attainment can be determined if the stimulus measurement
can be correlated with the perceptual responses. This
correlation measures the functional validity of the
perceptual response.
Chapter VI: Dedicated to the study and analysis of the Brunswik's
main methodological issue, namely, the comparative values of the
systematic design versus the representative design. Since Brunswik
wanted to show the universe of situations, that is, the natural cultural
habitat of the organism (Ecology), he needed a sort of design that
would cover two different points:
1. It could reflect accurately the probabilistic nature of
environmental circumstances.
2. It could exhibit the full measure of the organism ability
to cope with environmental contingencies. The classical
systematic design manipulates and changes stimulation
patterns. The representative design recognizes the
probabilistic nature of environment and behavioral laws
and attempts to sample reaction to the stimulus pattern
across the range of normally expected environmental settings.
Educational Relevance
8
Chapter VII : Presents some basic generalizations useful in
metatheoretical and educational purposes. Some of these generalizations
are:
1. Psychological analysis must focus on the organism's
achievements in adjusting to its environment.
2. The environmental regularities to which the organism
can adjust are probabilistic rather than certain.
3. Perceptual discrimination may be regarded as response
patterns of probabilistic cues; it can be argued that in
Brunswik's system are implicit some direct points that
are directly related with the unity of science as well as
with the philosophy of science and that these need some
logical order explanation. It can also be argued that in
Brunswik's system are valuable frames of reference
applicable to educational systems.
This study will attempt to establish that:
1. In education there is a lack of established relation ships
with other behavioral sciences (Antrhopology, Psychology,
Biology, etc.);
2. in contemporary educational systems very few useful
theories have been developed;
93. that educational research, mostly in new fields, i.e.
,
teaching, learning, thinking, etc., should be based on a
new conception of metatheoretical analysis—a metatheory
is a theory concerned with the development, investigation
or description of theory itself— reflecting Brunswikian
consideration.
By revisiting Brunswik’s work (there is only one book on Brunswik’s
system presently available) it is felt that these premises can be examined,
explained and supported and some new approaches to the theoretical basis of
the behavioral sciences can be made.
CHAPTER II
SOME BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON EGON BRUNSWIK
Egon Brunswik was bom in Budapest in 1903. His father was
Hungarian and his mother Austrian. His childhood languages were Hungarian
and German; thus he was brought up in a bilingual atmosphere.
When he was eight, he was sent to Vienna to be educated at the
Theresianische Akademie Empire's Gymnasium. There he received
instruction in Science, Classical Literature, Mathematics and History.
After returning from Sweden, where he was sent with his sister to
recover from the First World War years, he took courses again at the
Theresianische Akademie and finally graduated in 1921.
From 1921 to 1923 he received training at the Vienna Technische
Hochschule to become an engineer, passing the state examination at the
end of that time.
In 1923, Brunswik made the important decision to study Psychology
and entered the University of Vienna. Here he worked under Karl Buhler's-1-
*Karl Buhler was bom in Meckesheim (Baden) in 1879, and died in
Pasadena (California) in 1963. He worked with Kulpe. He worked as a
Professor at Wurzburg, Bonn, Munich, Dresden and Vienna. In 1934, he
settled in Los Angeles. Primary fields: Child Psychology, Thought and
11
direction and was influenced by the ’’Vienna Circle” of Logical Positivism. 2
Two of his classmates were Paul F. Lazarsfield and the future Nobel Prize-
winner Konrad Lorenz.
In 1926 he earned the necessary degree to qualify as a Gymnasium
teacher in Mathematics and Physics.
In 1927 Brunswik received his Ph. D. and became Karl Buliler's
Assistant at the Psychologische Institut.
The following yeare were rich in teaching experiences. He worked
one year at the Real Gymnasium, several years at Vienna's Pedagogical
Institute, and the Vienna Volkshochschule, and from 1931 to 1932 was a
Language. Mostly concerned with the non-sensorial nature of language and
with the multiplicity of methods that were crowding Psychology. Buhler
stressed the necessity for some kind of agreement between the methodology
of the natural sciences and the more phenomenological methodology of
psychology. Major works: Die Geistige Entwicklung des Kindes
,
1929;
Die Krise dcr Psychologic, 1927 ; Ausdruckstheorie, 1933; Sprachtheorie ,
1934.
o
The ’’Vienna Circle” or "Vienna School” was the Neopositivist and
Ope rationalist group of thinkers led by K. P. Moritz and M. Schlick which
maintained that Philosophy had no specific content. Hence by means of
Mathematical Logic, Philosophy helped to classify conceptual contradictions
in the empirical and experimental sciences and improve their prepositional
systems. Some of Sc lick’s followers were R. Carnap, K. Popper,
P. Frank, H. Reichanbach and V. Kraft.
See "eclecticism," "empiricism," "operationalism, " "physicialism,
"
"proposition" and "reductionism" at Appendix A.
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visiting lecturer at Ankara's School of Education in Turkey. Here he
managed to establish the first recognized laboratory of Psychology in that
country. Back in Vienna in 1934, he was designated "Private-dozent"3 of
the University of Vienna.
In 1935 Brunswik made his first important American contacts.
Daring the 1935-1936 period, he received a Rockefeller Fellowship which he
used to do research in Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley.
In 1937, aware of the increasing political difficulties in Europe, he returned
to Berkeley as Assistant Professor and there he settled permanently.
In 1938 he married Else Frenkel, who had also been familiar with
Buhler’s Institut in Vienna. Egon and Else Brunswik became American
citizens in 1943.
In 1942, suffering from hypertension, Brunswik underwent a
sympathectomy
,
which reduced his blood pressure. However from then
on, his health remained delicate and he was forced periodically to limit his
social and professional contacts, though his work continued to be as creative
as it had always been until his untimely death in 1955.
^University lecturer in Germany. An appointive rank obtained by a
medical or professional student after having served as "Arzliche Approbation. "
After serving successfully as "Private-dozent," he may, upon recommendation
of the faculty, receive the title of a professor.
CHAPTER III
SOME CONSIDERATIONS IMPLIED IN BRUNSWIK’S
PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISM
Integration and independence in Scientific Psychology
Bnmswik's systematic approach is oriented toward the integration of
two basic positions, namely a Methodological physicalism (Morris, 1937;
Jorgensen, 1951) and a theoretical functionalism (Allport, 1955; Feigl, 1955;
Hilgard, 1955; Prentice, 1956). Favoring both attitudes implies that:
(a) psychological methods are regarded as similar to those used in
the development of other sciences. A community of objective methods of
observation and measurement form the basic foundation of the so-called unity
of science^ (Carnap, 1938; Neurath, 1938; Hempel, 1952, 1956; Allport, 1955;
Wolman, 1970). However, it further implies that
(b) psychology also intends to remain free enough to develop its own
body of necessary analytical instruments 2 and theoretical considera-
^See also the term "science" in Appendix A.
2We regard analysis here as a method of studying phenomena by breaking
up the object of study into smaller units, either by physical separation or by
thinking separately about the distinguishable parts or qualities of the object. One
view of analysis as research into elementary components or as a means of re-
ducing them to simple S — R elements is explained later on in this papei.
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tions.^
Flexibility of behavior processes
The organism’s achievement in adjusting to the environment (Brunswik,
1943; Feigl, 1955; Postman, 1955) is the main concern of psychological
functionalistic theory. Consequently the success of behavior is sustained by
the stability and flexibility of the processes that behavior involves. Some of
these processes are in the field of perception, thinking and learning.
Brunswik stresses the value of treating them in a broad ideographic analysis
(Windelband, 1894; Allport, 1937; Postman, 1955) and thus eliminating any
reductionistic tentation (Nagel, 1935; 1949; Thompson and Braithwaite, 1952;
Krech, 1955; Kemeny and Oppenheim, 1956).
Perceptual discrimination and vicarious functioning
Perceptual discrimination (Brunswik, 1937, 1944, 1951, 1956; Allport,
1955) is considered as a response to examples of probabilistic cues. These
cues are accumulated and combined by the organism to achieve a correct
discrimination, and at the same time are used interchangeably; thus different
^ We understand theory as a general principle, supported by conside-
able data, proposed as an explanation of a group of phenomena; theory is also
a statement of the relations believed to prevail in a comprehensive body of
facts. Theories are more solidly supported by evidence than are hypotheses;
they are less firmly established than law; and they generally cover a wider
range than a single law, which is usually limited to a single kind of relationship.
See also ’'theory” in Appendix A.
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examples of cues can lead to the same effects. Similar correspondence
occurs when different motor responses result in equivalent behavioral
achievement. This property is called vicarious functioning (Feigl, 1955
;
Hammond, 1955) and is representative of the semierratic character of the
environment to which behavior adjusts.^
Psychological prediction
Psychological prediction (Reichenbach, 1938; Mehl, 1954; Beach, 1967)
admits the semierratic nature of the environment. Since the organism reacts
to events in a probable way, the predictions of behavioral achievement are
necessarily probabilistic rather than certain (Brunswik, 1939, 1943, 1951,
1955a, 1955b). This demonstrates that the understanding of empirical
examination and discovery comes from the functionalistic emphasis on
achievement and the adjustative qualities of behavior . 5
The concept of vicarious functioning calls for a more detailed
explanation. Vicarious functioning can be understood as the substitution of
one psychological process for another. One sensory process S' may be sub-
stituted for another. S” - equipotentiality—and one response R-^ for another
R2—equifinality— , so that, in learning, for example, the stimulus situations
may differ from that of the practice period, and the response likewise, yet
a new relationship can be demonstrated between SM and R 2 . It has to be
distinguished from generalization, either of stimulus or response, in which
the stimuli S’ and S" and R-^ and R^ must belong to the same family and be
very similar. In vicarious functioning there need be equivalence only, with
no similarity at all.
^Given the multiplicity of meanings of psychological prediction theory
some classification is needed. See the term "prediction" in Appendix A.
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Perception and reasoning as representative of
Brunswik's thought
Wlien Brunswik refers to the utilization of cues, he points out that the
organism relies on a process similar to statistical reasoning. 6 In Brunswik's
conception of statistical reasoning there is a process akin to Hermann von
Helmholtz’s (1821-1894) theory of unconscious inference (Helmholtz, 1856;
Gruber, 1956 ; Warren, 1968). Helmholtz believed that perception is a two-
n
stage process. The bases of perception are manifested in the sensations,
whose quality and intensity are inborn, and which are conditioned by specific
characteristics of the sense organs. Sensations themselves, however, have
no significance for space and object perception; they are merely signs that
acquire significance only in the course of development by association through
Statistical Psychology is a mathematical-model psychology that has
to be distinguished from the use of statistics in designing a conclusion from
empirical data. Statistical Psychology is preferred as a systematic attempt
to substitute a mathematical model for traditional constructs.
7As additional information on the study of perception the following
paragraph may be important: ". .
.
perception has not until recently been
a markedly American subject of investigation. . . only after World War II
psychologists began to see some functional implications in the study of
perception. They began to see how perception is in many cases imbedded
in and formed by the activities and purposes and needs of the perceiver.
They saw the possibility of throwing light on motivational and personal
variables through the study of perception; they even saw perception as a
kind of paradigm of all complex behavior" (Prentice, 1956, p. 37).
17
experience. The acquisition of meaning consists, in Helmholtz’s opinion,
of judgment processes that may be conscious to begin with but that become
automatic, after repeated association, as unconscious inferences which,
because of their compulsive character, appear as evident perceptions.
Helmholtz thus adopted a distinctly empirical position in the empirism vs.
nativism argument inperception theory. However, between Helmholtz and
Brunswik's positions there are some comparisons that have to be made in
the context of this thesis. The first is Brunswik’s assertion that the analysis
of perception can be made without any reference to the question of conscious
experience. The second is that perceptual inferences—as Helmholtz points
out are not rational but independent of any intellectual influence. And
finally, the only possible agreement between both authors is that reasoning
and perception lead to a similar goal: the acquisition of knowledge. In
Brunswik’s words (Brunswik, 1954) the formal characteristic of reasoning
furnishes a model—the ratiomorphic model—to which the processes and
achievements of perception and thinking can be referred.
Nomothetic—universal laws vs. ideographic
—
probabilistic laws
Psychological scientific generalizations are necessarily probabilistic
O
because those traits of the ecological environment that can be sensed by the
organism are broadly unpredictable (Brunswik, 1943; Allport, 1955; Hilgard,
g
For a broader discussion of ecology see Appendix A.
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1955; Postman, 1955; Wolman, 1970). On the one hand, universal laws9
are the consequence of physical measurements of the environment; on the
other hand, the organism cannot control environmental conditions and so
enforce these same laws. This does not represent a failure of the law itself,
only an acknowledgement of the fact that a wide range of events are not
described by universal laws. Hence, physical laws and ecological correlations
have a complementary relationship rather than being in opposition. 10 So,
while physical laws refer to relationships that have been perceived once
A law is a verbal statement supported by such ample evidence as not
to be open to doubt unless much further evidence is obtained of the way events
of a certain nature consistently and uniformly occur. Note that a natural
law is not conceived as controlling events: it simply describes them. Some
authors use the term 'law" where "generalization" or "principle" would be
more appropriate.
"^Though on page the relationship between "environment" and
"ecology" is described in the context of Brunswik’s work, it is valuable to
mention here that "within the realm of facts existing at a given time one can
distinguish three areas in which changes are or might be of interest to
psychology: 1. The ’life space’; i.e.
,
the person and the psychological
environment as it exists for him. We usually have this field in mind if we
refer to needs, motivation, mood, goals, anxiety, ideals. 2. A multitude
of processes in the physical or social world that do not affect the life space
of the individual at that time. 3. A ’boundary zone’ of the life space:
certain parts of the physical or social world do affect the state of the life
space at that time. The process of perception, for instance, is intimately
linked with this boundary zone because what is perceived is partly determined
by the physical ’stimuli’; i.e.
,
that part of the physical world which affects
the sensory organs at that time. Another process located in the boundary
zone is the ’execution of an action’ (Lewin, 1941, p. 306).
19
irrelevant conditions have been eliminated, ecological correlations refer
to all those relations that exist in the normal conditions of the organism
habitat. 11 one clear example of tins sort of correlation is shown in Figure
Ihe reductionist position and the mediational mechanism
There is a final problem that has to be treated in relation to Brunswik's
theoretical and methodological conceptualizations, namely the so-called
mediational mechanism. 12 The traditional theory-usually described in S-R
terms expresses the idea that certain stimuli, also called signs in this theory,
do not directly initiate instrumental behavior but activate an intervening
process that is connected in a complex systematic way with many action
systems. Mediational analysis, though, refers to specific chains of events
leading from stimulus to response. To some extent, mediational positions
Habitat refers to the entire geographical environment of an organism
at a certain stage of its development. The habitat consists of inanimate and
animate environmental factors. Environment is a collective term for all the
influences impinging on an organism. For a more accurate explanation of
the term see Appendix A.
12The nature of the mediating processes have an important part in
Feigl’s comments (Feigl, 1955, p. 232).
20
Variables
correlated
Ecological
validities
Partial correlations
Law of
physical
optics
Variables
held
constant
Coefficient
B x P
. TO D 1.00
B x D
. TT P 1.00 B = PD
D x P
. 08 B
-1.00
Fig. 1. Relationship between ecological validities and
physical laws ( Brunswik, 1955
,
p. 209 ).
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can be considered as reductionists (Krech, 1955). Brunswik's point of view
in this question (Tolman and Brunswik, 1935) is rather eeclectic. First,
because distal achievement13
—a key problem in Brunswik's perceptual
development-can be mediated in many different ways and, second, because
Brunswik himself is not opposed to the fact of mediational processes. He
stresses mainly an order of preference in the action bof behavioral patterns.
If we know accurately the nature of the organism's achievement and the
varieties of the proximal patterns that make the achievement possible, we can
look for reductionistic explanations that will not be a challenge to a functional
analysis of behavior but rather its normal compliment.
i, i , 1.
The analysis of behavior by means of the
regional reference
The center of Brunswik's system is evidenced by the classification of
those variables that are the bases of the functionalist analysis of behavior
(Brunswik, 1955; Allport, 1955). Such a classification of variables rests on
the concept of the regional reference, clearly exposed by Brunswik, which
constitutes a fundamental step in his work (Brunswik, 1939). Figure 2
presents:
13As one example of distal-proximal concepts: the upper arm is in
the proximal position, the lower arm is in the distal position relative to the
shoulder which is in the central position. See a detailed explanation in
Appendix A.
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ENVIRONMENT (Causal texture)
Remote past of organism
Mampulable physical bodies (DISTAL STIMULI)
(PROXIMAL STIMULI)
Intraorganismic ev
central
ents and dispositions
Proximal reactions (MO LECULAR BEHAVIOR)
Distal effects of reactions (MOLAR BEHAVIORAL ACHIEVEMENTS)
Far-reaching successes, products of life
activities
ENVIRONMENT (Causal texture)
Fig. 2. The regional reference (Brunswik, 1939, p. 42)
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(a) the regional reference defined as the degree of remoteness from
the organism depicted by a given variable;
(b) the antecedent circumstances of behavior that are shown in terms/
i V l i 0.1.
of distal and proximal variables;
(c) those distal variables that are events in the environment while
proximal variables are events at the limits of the organism;
(d) those events which, happening within the organism, are ordered
as central variables.
Examples of distal variables are the measured physical objects with
which the organism is not in near contact; examples of proximal variables
could be the retinal images produced by distal stimulus. 14
The observable effects of the antecedent circumstances of behavior
are again classified into distal and proximal variables. The change in
position of a manipulated object steps up the distal effect while the distinctive
movements of the organism illustrate the proximal effects.
Hence in terms of variables:
(a) the distal and the proximal stimuli are the systematic independent
variables
;
14The regional reference "in action" is shown in Figure 3.
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ECOLOGICAL
ENVIRONMENT
ECOLOGICAL
ENVIRONMENT
Fig. 3. The regional reference "in action"
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(b) the proximal effector responses and distal environmental effects
are the systematic dependent variables
,
and
(c) central events are considered as intervening variables.
Brunswik has not pointed out a special relationship among central
events and dependent and independent variables. These functions are explained
m Figure 4 under the name of "process details. " The example of perceptual
judgement as a central event can be qualitatively conceptualized as expressing
the use of cues by the organism.
The functionalist analysis especially stresses the meaning of the
relationships among dependent and independent variables on the basis of:
(a) the degree of association between Distal and proximal stimuli-
variables defining the ecological validity of cues;
(b) the degree of association between proximal movements and distal
effects, pointing out the amount of uncertainty related to the acquisiton of
goals by means of specific classes of operations.
Regional reference and historical development
Once the meaning and distribution of all those variables are know, it
is possible, following Brunswik's conceptualization (Brunswik, 1930, 1952,
1959, 1963; Heider, 1939), to describe those regions whose inner relations
come under the study of scientific psychology during a period of time, and
to classify trends and goals in these relationships. Brunswik looks at the
historical development of psychology basically with respect to Psychophysics,
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Gestalt psychology and his own fnnctionaJism (Brunswick, 1952; see also
Figure 5).
Psychophysics
The psychology of sensations developed at the very beginning of
experimental psychology, its essential relation with the micromediational
physiologism (Hammond, 1966) was a decided advantage in the development
of scientific research. The basic foundation of this investigation was proximal
stimulation, peripheral physiological excitation and neural transmission.
Hence the "declared core of the classical approach in psychology is structurally
to analyze.
. . the basic elements of consciousness" (Brunswik, 1952, p. 52);
a place has to be found for consciousness. In Brunswik's words, again,
psychophysics is
Concerned with a functional relation which, although
short-arc and thus elementaristic by comparison
with later types of research, establishes the principle
of studying a gross stimulus-response relationship,
while problems of sensory and nervous technology
are moved to a secondary position. One of the terms
of the relationship, here the response, is conceived
of as conscious content, i.e., sensation; verbal or
other expressive behavior is interpreted as a tool
of introspection. The programmatic outlook of
psychophysics is thus physicalistic with respect
to the stimulus, while it remains mentalistic con-
cerning to response; in short, it proposes to be
S-objective, R-subjective (Brunswik, 1952, pp.
52-53). 15
15See Figure 5.
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For Bnmswik, psychology is narrowly confined because this type of
approach concentrates on relations with tire preximal stimulus impact, and
doesn't reach the biologically most relevant layer (Brunswik, 1952, p. 57) .
This layer or region is that of manipulable and social objects. Brunswik's
view is that psychology in this situation only shares an insignificant form
of functionalism.
Gestalt
m Brunswik's opinion. Gestalt psychology expands the limited proximal-
peripheral focus defended by Psychophysics. However, the step forward
taken by this group was not enough to constitute a compromise between
Gestalt and the objects in the environment. It seems that there is an
inconsistency inside the Gestalt position in relationship to the distal determina-
tion of perception. As previously noted, Gestalt's "original program was to
make meaning dynamically real and to give a solution to the problem of the
correlation of the organism to the object world.
. . in the psychology of
perception the environmental distal determination is disregarded,
"
(Heider,
1939, p. 167).
Functionalism
While Gestalt psychology refuses to treat objects, Functionalism appears
as a supporter of the contrary position. Coming from the evolutionary theory
position functionalism has always concerned itself with the environment
and the organism, which, translated into Brunswikian terms, means treating
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of distai events, objects and persons. Psychology had to expand its frame-
work to include distal and central regions as well as objects. To achieve
this, Brunswik urged some important steps (Brunswik, 1952):
(a) distal variables
-including objects and persons—must be employed
in psychology;
(b) central states
—motivation, attitudes, personal characteristics—
goal achievement—should be observed;
(d) wide-arched dependencies must be considered the basic source
of problems for psychology and the dependencies of distal causes and distal
effects.
The use of variables and perceptual constancies
Brunswik' s system has its conceptual foundations in the analysis of
the perceptual constancy (Brunswik, 1944, 1956; Allport, 1955; Hilgard, 1955).
The perceptual constancy shows:
First, how the organism discriminates and copes with distal events;
Second, the probable rather than unequivocal connection between distal
and proximal events; and
Third, the equivalence of a broad and variate assembly of proximal
stimuli in mediating a constant perceptual achievement. Thus, achievement,
probabilistic laws and vicarious functioning that are the prominent traits of
Brunswik's system are inferred directly from the study of the perceptual
constancies.
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The handling of the constancy experiment requires the choice of
empirical variables in much of Brunswik's investigation. Thus, (a) on the
independent side, physical measurements of size, weight, brightness, etc,
are used to measure the distal variables: (b) the traditional family of sensory
cues represents the proximal variables and (c) the dependent variables are
in general the conventional responses of the psychophysical experiment that
occur in matching and in verbal reports. As has been repeatedly pointed
out, Brunswik did not assume a one-to-one correlation between verbal
expressions and experience. The dependent variables, like the independent
ones, are in the last analysis changeable into operations of physical measure-
ment, so the study of perceptual achievement can be carried out without any
reference at all to conscious experience.
Functional relationships and correlational measurements
The probabilistic condition of psychological laws is expressed in the
statement of functional relationships (Postman and Tolman, 1959). Relation-
ships between distal and proximal variables are expressed almost exclusively
in terms of the correlation coefficient. The correlation coefficient is also
used as an index of perception achievement, e,g.
,
the correspondence
between the measured physical properties of an object and perceptual estimates.
Higher orders of correlational analysis, e.g.
,
multiple and partial correlations,
can be used to measure more complex sorts of functional relational relationships.
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It must be noted that correlations are used to reflect the relationships
among independent and dependent variables and odo not measure the
association between the responses of individuals. In the functionalist's use
of the correlation coefficient, objects and individuals have changed places:
it is the tests that are varied and the individuals that are held constant.
Functional relations can be determined on the basis of data obtained from one
subject in a sample of situations.
One-variable and multiple- variable designs
versus systematic design
Brunswik’s first interest was in the experimental design that provide
the data for psychological measurements. He disregarded the classical one-
variable design, and found the more recent multivariate design insufficient.
In such systematic designs, both the values of the independent variables and
the manner of covariation among variables are arbitrarily and artificially
restricted (Brunswik, 1955, 1956). Systematic design had to be replaced
by representative design, that is, a design that was more representative
of the organism’s natural and cultural habitat and whose characteristics
could be sampled. Measurement must not be allowed to interfere with the
patterns of variables that move in uncontrolled environmental situations.
Thus (1) the representative sampling of situations becomes a necessary
condition for the determination of valid functional relationship; (2) it is
important to keep in mind that the requirements of representative sampling
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are more relevant to situations than to variables; (3) once a sample o£
stations had been established, the relationship between specific variables
(distal and proximal) could be determined from the instances included in the
sample and expressed as correlation coefficient. And finally (4) whereas
representative design precedes experimental manipulation and control, it
allows the isolation of variables by statistical means.
Partial correlation can be used to hold a given variable or set of
variables constant and thus to determine the relationship between an isolated
cue and perceptual response. Similarly, the effects of particular combinations
of variables can be estimated by means of multiple correlation (Postman and
Tolman, 1959).
Some last remarks on Bnmswik’s system
Brunswik was disposed to consider his system of analysis as one that
would fulfill the criteria of a model in the broad sense of the word. Thus,
his lens model mentions in detail the fundamental variables to be used in the
analysis of achievement and shows the empirical functions that make it
possible, namely (1) to measure the degree of achievement and (2) to reconstruct
the sequence of processes which make it possible. Using the concept of model
in this sense, we find that formal characteristics of reasoning—the so-called
"ratiomorphic" model (Brunswik, 1954)—supplies Brunswik with a set of
criteria for the evaluation of cognitive achievement. In the application of
these criteria there is no less concern with deviations from the model than
34
with conformance to it (Postaan and Tolman, 1959). in summary, in the
"rational reconstruction of behavior" (Brunswik, 1954) no assumption is made
that behavior is, in fact, rational; on the contrary he stresses the intuitive
nature of the perceptual process and the difficulty in managing it.
Range of Brunswik T s study
As has been pointed out in this description of Bmnswik's system, its
major application is in the field of perceptual constancies (Brunswik, 1937,
1940, 1944, 1956). The main goal of the investigation was the study of the
conditions representative of daily life. 16 Hie difference in the treatment
of perceptual constancies in Brunswik's research is revealed in the following
steps:
(1) The extent and flexibility of perceptual achievement were proved
m extensions of the constancy paradigm to new dimensions of discrimination.
(2) The sensitivity of the constancy process to the changing conditions
of the organism was exhibited in studies of the effect of attitude.
(3) The modification of perceptual constancy by experience was
investigated in studies of developmental trends and of the effects of training.
(4) Studies of social perception (judgments of facial expressions and
personality charac were carried out by Brunswik for the exposition '
l^See, for example, Figure 6 for descriptive titles of consecutive
episodes in the behavior stream of a six-year-old girl (Barker, Wright, and
Schoggen, 1961).
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Watching bigger girls form a pyramid (gymnastic)
Taking off her shoes
Going closer to the big girls
Putting on her shoes
Admiring bracelet on Alice
Poking Alice
Looking at Winifred’s ladybug
Following Alice
Watching boys
Looking into porch of schoolroom
Closing door of schoolroom
Watching girls play hopscotch
Giving Harry his shoe
Getting bracelet from Alice
Interfering in Delia’s and Winifred's fight
Admiring bracelt on Alice
Fig. 6. Barker's ecological observation (1968)
of his experimental design theory. 17
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(5) Acknowledgement of the essential uncertainty of the connections
among environmental events led to the realization of the systematic value of
partial reinforcement. Thus probabilistic functionalism goes further in
psychology than the field of perception as for example in probability learning.
Finally, it is important to stress the influence of Brunswik's
methodological and theoretical tools on modem educational-psychological
research. They have been directed toward two main specific goals, namely,
the search for consistent theories in teaching (Snow, 1968) and die quest for
representativeness in educational experiments (Bracht and Glass, 1968;
Snow, 1973). Description and analysis of both is obligatory to an exposition
of Brunswik's conceptual body as provided in this paper.
17
See Figure 7. See also the term "physiognomy" on Appendix A.
arid*
medium
narrow
hiqh medium low
Fig. 7. Factorial variation of schematized face and schematized
face experiment, with indices of apparent intelligence.
(Brunswik and Reiter, 1937)
CHAPTER IV
THE ENVIRONMENT
Stimulus arrangement and environmental ecology
It has been usual among experimental psychologists to define stimulus
presentations in terms of the physical operations used to measure them.
Any classification of such stimuli is made with two basic considerations:
(1) the requirements of experimental design and (2) the theory or organismic
behavior to be examined. But what is disregarded in this consideration is the
problem of what relation the stimulus arrangement has to the distal objects
in the ecology in which the organism has developed and to which it has to be
accommodated. As we will see in a series of Brunswik’s quotations later
in this thesis, it has become rather clear that organisms must act in relation
to objects and object properties in their environment and not in relation to
isolated proximal data. If organisms did react to immediate stimulus
events—in ecology’s lexicon, proximal—they would be bound to a semi-
erratic environment. The immediate question now is: what is the relationship
between the nondirect observable characteristics of distal objects and the
proximal data brought out by these objects ? The conceptualization of this
relationship has to be made at the very beginning to prevent construction by
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most of the classical modem psychologists of irregular presentation in
their experiments which tend to emphasize concerns for operations in the
central region rather than the more environmentally based distal-proximal
or distal-distal relationships.
Toward a conceptualization of the environment
Brunswik's first step toward a conceptualization of the environment
was to express in a clear way what he meant by discrimination between the
surface of the environment and its depth. In other words, the possible
relationship between the distal layers of the environment and their proximal
complement leans on the fact that the relation between the distal variables
and proximal data, or proximal cues, is uncertain. Let us look at this
fundamental passage:
On the perception side, an example of a distal
variable is the distance of objects. Causal
chains determined by distance will, on their way
into the organism, exert certain proximal effects,
or criteria, upon the sensory surface of the
organism. The most important feature of the general
relationship between distal and proximal stimulus
variables is its lack of univocality . 1
Mainly related to Logic, univocal is a term that refers to only one
object or class of objects; it tends to be used also for singleness of denotation
(i.e., singleness of reference to things).
40
Firstly, there is ambiguity2 in the direction from cause to effect.
Inventories of possible cues for third-dimensional distance have been
compiled from the beginnings of psychological inquiry. Current textbooks
list something like ten depth criteria, such as binocular parallax, convergence
of the eye axes, accommodation, linear and angular perspective, interception
of far objects by near objects, atmospheric effects, number of in-between
objects, vertical position. The list could be extended considerably further.
The necessity for becoming so involved derives from the fact none of these
proximal variables can be considered to be the distance cue in the sense of
an effect which would be present without exception whenever the distal
condition should obtain. Some of the cues will more often, others less often,
be present, depending on circumstances, and occasionally all of them may be
cut off (so the fact of a certain distance relationship must remain unrecognized
by the organism in question).
Secondly, there also is ambiguity in the reverse direction, that is to
say, from effect to cause. A certain proximal stimulus feature, such as
binocular parallax, may ordinarily be due to differences in depth, but could
^Ambiguous : term pertaining to a statement, or to a situation, that
has two meanings, or is capable of two interpretations. The doubleness of
meaning is implicitly attributed to the statement, situation, or object,
however much it may later be proved to have been due to the observer.
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occasional as well be caused by an artificial set up of two flat pictures in
a stereoscope. Or the characteristic trapezoidal shape of retinal images
constituting the depth criterion of perspective may frequently be due to
distortion of rectangular objects seen under an angle, i.e., extending into
the third dimension; but it may also be due to an actual trapezoidal object
m a frontal position with all its points at the same distance from the eye.
On the environmental portion of the effect side, the relationships
between objects and cues are replaced, in a symmetrical fashion, by the
relationships between means and ends, or between proximal actions or habits
and distal results. Examples showing the ambiguity of these relationships
in both causal directions could easily be given in analogous fashion to the
ones discussed above for the perception side (Brunswik, 1943, pp. 256-257).
Information and means for organisniic achievement
In order for the organism to perceive accurately, to achieve, the
object, the organism must have information that is provided by stimulation
at the proximal layer, also called sensory cue. These cues are the physical
stimuli that strike on the surface of the organism; they are also local signs
related to the world of objects. In other words, proximal stimuli are local
representatives of distal variables. All these statements were clearly
expressed by Brunswik and Tolman in 1935:
Each of us has come to envisage psychology as
primarily concerned with the methods of responses
of the organism to two characteristics features of
the environment. The first of these features lies in
the fact that the environment is a causal texture
(Kausalgefuge) in which different events are regularly
dependent upon each other. And because of the
presence of such causal couplings (Kausal-koppelungen),
actually existing in their environments, organisms
come to accept one event as a local representative
(Stellvertreter) for another event. It is by the use of
such acceptances or assertions of local representatives
that organisms come to steer their ways through that
complex network of events, stimuli and happenings,
which surrounds them. By means of such local
rep res entation (Stellvertretung) the organism comes
to operate in the presence of the local representative
in a manner more or less appropriate to the fact of
a more distant object or situation, i.e.
,
the entity
represented (das Vertretene).
The second feature of the environment to which the
organism also adjusts is the fact that such causal
connections are probably always to some degree
equivocal (mehrdeuting)
. Types of local representatives
are, that is, not connected in simple one-one,
univocal (eindeuting) fashion, with the types of entities
represented. Any one type of local representative is
found to be causally connected with different frequencies
with more than one kind of entity represented and
vice versa. And it is indeed, we would assert, this
very equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit) in the causal
"representation" strands in the environment which
lend to psychological activities of organisms many
of their most outstanding characteristics.
It appears also that, whereas the one of us, Tolman
was led to emphasize these two facts of local
representation and of equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit)
by a study of the relations of means-objects
(Mittelgegensstande) the ends (Zielgegenstande) in
the learning activities of rats, the other, Brunswik
was led to emphasize these same concepts as a result
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of an examination of the relations of stimulus
-cues
or signs (Reize als Anzeichen) to Gegenstande as a
result of a study of relations involved in the
"Konstanz" phenomenon in human perception
(Brunswik and Tolman, 1935, pp. 43-45).
Brunswik and Tolman represent a fortunate combination in treating
of the nature of behavior environment interaction despite the historical
fact that Brunswik has dedicated himself mostly to perception and Tolman to
learning.
Ecological validity of cues
It must be concluded from the preceding paragraph that cues—and
mean-objects—have an equivocal or probabilistic relation to the object
intended. It follows also that this relation must be described in terms
that permit quantitative measures of the degree of relationship. Brunswik
employed the correlation coefficient for this purpose, and the correlation
between distal and proximal variables describes the ecological validity of
the cue. Brunswik’ s experimental work on this problem is exposed in this
text and in Figure 7:
Any fairly consistent rapport, be it intuitively
perceptual or explicitly rational, with distal
layers of the environment presupposes the
existence of proximal sensory cues of some
degree of ecological validity to serve as
mediators of that relationship (Brunswik, 1956,
p. 48).
as it does in this broader one:
Preliminary results obtained by Seidner, as yet
unpublished, suggest the following logical
validities, i.e.
, correlations of the real distances
m the situations photographed-reconstructed from
the pictures in terms of a crude five-point scale
with a sufficient degree of reliability
—with the
actual location, color, etc.
,
of their projections
in the photographs
:
About .6 for the cue of "vertical position, " i.e.
,
for the prbability of greater real distance for
objects appearing higher up on the picture.
About
.4 (biserial) for "filling of space" (measured
by the number of items, i.e.
, distinguishable steps,
between the projection of two objects), more items
between objects being associated with greater
differences in real depth.
About .2 for "color" (i.e., on the achromatic
pictures used, the local brightness of a spot),
greater brightness increasing the chances of
greater real distances—as would blue vs. red.
The relatively small and possibly biased samples of
situations so far used by Seidner—75 instances
from 12 pictures for each cue,—as well as the
inherent inaccuracy in the determination of real
distances from photographs alone and, finally
certain difficulties in precisely defining the variables,
especially the retinal gradients, involved, make the
numerical values listed subject to considerable
revision. In Figure 8 the obtained coefficient are
given to two decimals; a question mark is added to
indicate the tentative character of the results.
. .
It will be remembered that in Figure 10 (Figure 8
in this text) a few question marks were inserted to
indicate the tentativeness of Seidener's results
concerning the ecological validity of some of the
well known perceptual depth criteria. In the mean-
time, Seidner continued his ecological analysis of
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Fig. 8. Schema of perceptual stabilization mechanisms
as exemplified by size constancy, including their
ecological foundation, with special emphasis on distance
criteria (Data from Brunswik, Seidner and Schriever).
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these criteria with a set o£ 30 original photographs
of scenes from the daily routine of a specific personSubsequently, on-the-spot depth measurements wereken for 20 points per picture, the points being
selected with the use of random number tables. A
total of 600 points (300 point pairs) was thus availablefor analysis
; for a sample of this size, correlations
oi
. 03 and over are statistically significant.
Coefficients obtained for the three edepth cues discussed
on page 49 and ff. are being presented here again with
the kind permission of Mr. Seidner. They are in partlower and in part higher than those reported on the
basis of the original asample of 75 point pairs from
magazine pictures; for each cue a reasonable definition
can be found under which significant validates are
obtained. Problems of definition center about such
questions as whether or not sky-points in the picture
should be included (assuming a fixed, rather large
distance for them), or whether extreme colors or a
neutral gray be taken as the zero point in defining
the color cue.
The validity of "vertical position" as an indicator of
real distance was tentatively given as . 61 in Figure
10. With the new sample it was found to be
. 41 with
sky-points included,
. 21 with sky points excluded;
both these values are significant.
The validity of "space-filling" was given as . 42 in
Figure 10 (Figure 8 in this text). Now it is about
. 10—still significant— with sky-points included; it
is . 15 or .22 without sky-points, depending on whether
the total number of discernible homogeneities between
the two sample points or their density per length unit
on the picture considered. In tills context it must be
kept in mind that loss of detail in photographing of
situations at greater distances tends to obscure the
validity of this cue.
The validity of "color" (albedo— ''brightness" — in
the picture) as cue for distance was given as . 23 in
Figure 10. Now it is as high as .39 with sky points
included; but it becomes insigificantly negative
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(-. 60) with sky-points excluded. The values remain
very similar (.36 and
.05, respectively) when
extreme albedos are taken as negative and a mediumgray as positive (Brunswik, 1956, pp. 49-50, 123).
Caus al texture of the environment
As described in the paper by Brunswik and Tolman (Brunswik and
Tolman, 1935) there is a kind of vicarious mediation between distal and
proximal layers of the environment called causal texture. The environment
has texture because it is not sharply defined and it is not constituted by a
series of one-to-one relations. The environment implies partial causes and
partial effects, in its own ecological relationship, independent of the behaving
organism. That is, not only are there less than perfect relations between
distal objects and proximal cues, but there are also correlations of less than
one between various cues for the same object (Hammond, 1966). Hence,
(1) the term "ecological validity" refers to the correlation between proximal
cue and distal object; (2) the "intra-ecological correlation" refers to the
relation between various features—cues—of the environment, and (3) if the
intra-ecological correlations between the cues for a given object are high,
the environment is redundant, 3 regarding the object in question (Hammond,
1966).
3Redundancy is said of the property of a message—in information
theory—which reduces the error of prediction for a given event to less than
chance by virtue of the fact that the message contains information about
what will come next.
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One important feature of these kinds of studies on the texture of the
environment is that they do not involve a subject. For Brunswik the goal of
psychology is the mutual comprehension between environment and organism.
Brunswik explicitly points out that:
One of the comparatively neglected tasks of a molar
environmental psychology is to find out the extent to
which environmental hierarchies of probabilities of
object-cue as well as of means-end relationships do
find a counterpart in similar hierarchies of evaluation
by the organism. This would mean that the environ-
mental probabilities be first ascertained for all of the
cues or means involved, with, say, the "normal life"
conditions of the organism taken as the defining
reference class. This part of the research would be
strictly environmental and prepartory in character
and would not involve any reference to organismic
reaction. Very little has thus far been done in the
direction of such an environmental analysis.
The most conspicuous exception is a certain knowledge
we have about the so-called "physiognomic" relation-
ships between certain mental states or abilities in our
fellow-men, and their external physical characteristics.
Such studies have, however, been imdertaken primarily
because of an interest centering in questions of the
expressiveness of human beings viewed as subjects
rather than because of an interest in some other subject’s
social environment and the problems confronting such a
subject in his approach to objects of social perception
(Brunswik, 1943, p. 259).
Thus, it is Brunswik's feeling that vicarious mediation—inter-
substitutability of cues—in the environment is a reality of Nature.
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Theoretical versus empirical consideration
There is a paper authored jointly by Brunswik and Kamiya (1953),
on the ecological validity of the Gestalt factor of "proximity, " that is
intended to show how theoretical issues can be sometimes opposed to empirical
ones. Of course the discussion implies a critical point of view toward the
nativistic Gestalt theory. Some excerpts of this work follow:
Gestalt psychologists have stressed the influence
of certain stimulus-factors upon figural unity in
perceptual organization. Prominent among these
factors are "proximity," "equality" (or "similarity");
"symmetry, " "good continuation, " and "closure"
in the sense of the closeness of a line pattern in the
stimulus-configuration.
According to orthodox Gestalt theory, the effectiveness
of these factors rests on dynamic processes inherent
in the brain field, rather than on accumulated past
experience; while occasioned by respective characteristic
of the stimulus configuration which acts as a set of
"topographical" factors at the boundary of the system,
the dynamic themselves are in the nature of "physical
Gestalten," that is, of spontaneous physiological
"self-distribution" built into the organism prior to,
and as a condition for rather than a result of—learning.
For this reason it is also said that the factors
mentioned operated in an "autochtonous" manner, that
is, are indigeneous to the organism so far as their
organizational effect is concerned (Brunswik and
Kamiya, 1953, p. 20).
Where, then, is the novelty of the Brunswik-Kamiya approach?
A more broadly functionalistic view of perception would
suggest an alternative interpretation of the factors of
perceptual organization which at the same time would
be well in keeping with modern learning theory.
According to this view these factors would be seen as
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guides to the life-relevant physical properties of
the remote environmental objects, and thus as
playing a part in adjustment; in more technical
language, they would be conceived of as proximal
"cues" to the so-called distal body reality.
The possibility of such an interpretation hinges
upon the "ecological validity" of these factors,
that is, their objective trustworthiness as
potential indicators of mechanical or other
relatively essential or enduring characteristics of
our manipulable surroundings. This problem
is analogous to that of the "physiognomic" or
external cues offered to the organism for potential
utilization in social perception.
. . .Another
analogy is with the so-called depth-cues in the
perception of third-dimensional space, such as
vertical position or subdivision of the field. For
some of these cues, ecological validities some-
what higher than those typical of social perception,
but still of definitely limited value, have been
established by Seidner ( Brunswik and Kamiya,
1953, p. 21).
Brunswik’s and Kamiya's emphasis on the necessity for sufficient
empirical analysis of the connection between stimuli and their natural sources
is stressed in this next paragraph:
Any study of ecological validity can be no more
than propedeutic to psychology: concern is limited
to a survey of statistical relations among variables
as typical of the natural or cultural habitat of an
individual or group while the question of the actual
utilization of cues or of other aspects of organismic
response is left untouched. In short, such studies
deal with potential cues, not with cues actually
employed. Yet ecological surveys are indispensable
not only for an understanding and appraisal of
responses but, as is especially true in our particular
case, for general problems in psychological theorizing
as well.
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There be no doubt that the ecological validity
of the Gestalt factors, when seen as potential
perceptual cues, could likewise be of no more than
very limited value. In part, perhaps for this
reason, but certainly at least in part by virtue of
their predilection for dynamic rather than learning-
type explanations, Gestalt psychologists were prone
to brush aside suggestions of "generalized experience"
as the possible source of the laws of perceptual
organizations (Brunswik and Kamiya, 1953, p. 21).
To state it briefly: (1) proximity is a potential cue to mechanical
coherence, so gestalitists are wrong in their thesis that the environmental
correlation between proximity and object characteristic is zero; (2) the
organism must utilize the cue to whatever extent it may be ecologically valid
or useful if the organism is to make a successful inference. In this regard
Brunswik and Kamiya make some important remarks in the final "Discussion"
of their work:
As in all studies aiming at representativeness, the
present analysis may in a strict sense be applied
only to the specific natural
-cultural universe from
which our sample is drawn. Although we have
made no effort to define this universe in a formal
way, it can probably be taken as a first approximation
to the universe to which most of us are perceptually
exposed.
The successful demonstration, within any framework
stipulated, of the ecological validity of a Gestalt-
factor does not automatically imply the legitimacy
of its interpretation as a learned cue. It merely
shows that an objective basis for probability learning
is offered the individual within the framework chosen.
Since, however, all ecological validities represent a
challenge to the organism for utilization, and since
probably many cues are actually being utilized
roughly in proportion to the degree of their validity,
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our findings lend plausibility support to the
reinterpretation of proximity as a cue amuirP ri by
generalized probability learning. If this shn„iH
'
become possible for other gestalt factors also, they
all could be seen as externally imposed upon,
rather than as innately intrinsic to, the process in
the brain; they would then appear as functionally
useful rather than as whimsically
"autochtonous. »
It goes without saying that such an interpretation
would lose much of its cogency if it would turn
out that proximity has similar organizing effects
in individuals, groups, or species in whose habitat
or cultura it has no (or opposite) ecological
validity (Brunswick and Kamiya, 1953, pp. 30-31).
It appears m all of these long quotations that Brunswik has a quite
important conception of his own on the nature of the environment as it used
by the subject, as well as an outstanding belief in the value of the organism's
ecology and in the acceptance of a theoretical and empirical analysis of the
environment.
CHAPTER V
THE NATURE OF THE ORGANISM AND THE LENS MODEL
The Organism and its survival stratus
Having exposed some of the bases of Brunswik’s conceptual system
and given an account of the environment, the next step is to infer from those
bases the essential qualities of adaptation and survival1 and their meaning
in terms of a theory of the organisms.
In his paper "Organismic achievement and environmental probability"
Brunswik points out several of these qualities for adaptability (Brunswik,
1943, p. 257).
The contributions of the organis. Survival and its
sub-units, which may be defined as the establishment
of stable interrelationships with the environment, are
possible only if the organism is able to establish
Survival is used at least in three senses in the social sciences. The
first usage is the general-continuing to live after some event. The second
usage carries over into the social sciences the idea of the survival of species
by the processes of random mutation and natural selection. Much social
science theory is built around this concept, but the concept itself is biological.
The third usage refers to "continuance of a custom" observance, etc.
,
after
the circumstances in which it originated or which gave it significance have
passed (l^lor, 1913; Hodgen, 1936; Malinowski, 1944; Murdock, 1949).
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compensatory balance in the lace of comparative
e aos wi hin the physical environment. Ambiguity
of cues and means relative to the vitally relevant
*
objects and results must find its counterpart in anigui y and flexibility of the proximal-pe pheral
mediating processes in the organism. This pattern
contrasts somewhat with the relatively specificfocusing of vital processes upon the central-
organismic and the distal-environmental variables.
Thus each class of behavioral achievement may be
represented, when telescoped into a composite
picture covering extended periods of time, by a
bundle of light rays passing through a convex lensfrom one focus to another, with a scattering of the
causal chains in the mediating layers.
When admitting that exact universal law control the environment, it is
important to note that this quality of lawfulness is often hidden behind a
semirerratic medium of probabilistic cue-objects relations. In other words
higher organisms must have flexibility enough in their proximal-peripherial
mediational processes to content successfully with the ambiguity between
cause and effect. Dispersion being one of nature's main features, the
organism must insure its survival by achieving durable relations with the
hidden regularities of a lawful world. It reaches such permanent relations
by means of a perceptual apparatus that interprets environmental cues as
asserted by their probable association with the distal variable and that
considers environmental means according to their probable association with
success (Hammond, 1966). In Brunswik's words:
Within the natural sciences, an example of the purely
enumerative approach is given by those branches of
geography that deal with topographical mapping. The
fact that no application of the general physical laws
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is possible without the constants, parameters and
boundary conditions furnished by geographic types
of information is frequently neglected in theoretical
discussion. Except at the level of control ordinarily
accessible only to the physicist observer, these
constants are not available (at least not fully so) to
the responding organism. Hence the chains from
select distal to proximal to central variables in
perception are chains of (probable) partial, rather
than of total, causation. The universal lawfulness of
the world is of limited comfort to the perceiver or
behavior not in a position to apply these laws, and he
therefore must rely largely on whatever snitches of
particular or semigeneralied information he may be
able to assemble. This is what we meant earlier in
this paper by the assertion that, ordinarily, organisms
must behave as if in a semierratic ecology (Brunswik,
1955, p. 237).
Dealing with a probabilistic rather than completely determined set of
cue-object relations, the psychologist can reasonably expect to look on the
organism as being probabilistic at the proximal
-peripheral layer. He can
also expect that the surviving organism has the capacity to establish variables
in the distal region. And it is fundamental for psychology to reach such
stable relationships with the distal layer "in the face of comparative chaos"
at the proximal
-peripheral boundary. In short, the organism reacts not
to proximal data but to objects, and focuses on them. As Brunswik clearly
illustrates
:
The necessary imperfection, inflicted upon achivements
—
as relations between classes—by the ambiguity in the
causal texture of the environment, which remains
apparent as long as a single variable, that is partial
causes and partial effects, are considered under other-
wise not specifically controlled conditions. Because of
this environmental ambiguity, no matter how smoothly the
organismic instruments and mechanisms may function,
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relationships cannot be foolproof, at least as far
as those connecting with the vitally more relevant
remote distal regions of the environment are
concerned. This intrinsic lack of perfection, that
is of univocality, will on the whole be greater the
more wide-spanning the relationships involved are.
The only way in which perfection could be secured
would be by control over all the remaining conditions
which could possibly become relevant in the given
case. This however is something the reacting
organism cannot do for lack of time if not for other
more serious reasons—and thus something which the
psychologist who wishes to catch and rationally to
reconstruct organismic adjustments at large, with
all of its faults and fallacies, should also not do.
All a finite, subdivine individual can do when acting
is to use a term of Reichenbach2 to make a posit,
or a wager (Reichenbach, 1938; 1943).
A good way to understand how Bnmswik handles the ambiguity of the
causal texture of the environment is to look at his construction of the lens
model.
2Hans Reichenbach (Hamburg, 1891—Los Angeles, California, 1953).
Though closely related to the "Vienna Circle" as well as to logical and
scientific empiricism and the Unity of Science movement, his position on
this premises are less radical. He calls his system "probabilistic
empiricism, " and stresses the importance of an "open" methodology that
goes beyond empirism and operationism. However, the probabilistic-
empiricist language cannot be separated from the external physical world.
Thus, any linguistic statement must be expressed in the context of the
empirical epistemology. But since any empirical statement is not absolutely
certain, it can only be established in terms of "posits" or, in other words,
in probabilistic terms.
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The lens model and more on ecological validity
The fundamental characteristics of probabilistic functionalism as a
main strategy for coping with the ecological relations within the environment-
organism situation are better understood in terms of the lens model
(Brunswik, 1939, 1952, 1955). This model is a refinement of the diagram
of the regional reference presented in Figure 2. The lens model stresses
distal achievement and vicarious functioning of proximal stimuli and responses.
The clearest way to understand its elements and context is to apply it to the
analysis of the perceptual thing-constancies.
The formal features of the model are those of a double convex lens.
A bundle of light rays emanating from an initial focus is made to converge
at a terminal focus. The initial focus represents a distal stimulus, i.e.
,
a measured physical property of an object in the environment. The rays
proceeding from this initial focus, labeled "process details," represents
the energy changes produced by the source. The energy changes result
in a sample of proximal effects acting on the sensory surface or exterior part
of the organism. The proximal effects act as cues and are represented in the
central column. The existence of proximal stimuli on the sensory surface
of the organism advances some processes within the organism—process
details which mediate the final perceptual response. This perceptual
response is the equivalent of the achivement of the organism in relation to
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distal stimulus aud is represented as a terminal locus. In short, this
analysis points out three well defined functional reladonships, those between
distal variable and proximal effects; those between proximal effects and
perceptual response, and those between distal variable and perceptual
response. A close inspection of these relations will be useful in revealing
the basic uncertainty of causal connections in the environment and the
probabilistic nature of psychological laws.
1* Distal variables and proximal effects.
In relation to the problem of ecological validity, some issues are
important for a clear interpretation of the lens model (Postman and Tolman,
1966; Reichenbach, 1938). First of all, the existence of a given distal
property does not imply a specific and predictable pattern of distal effects.
Thus, m the example of the distal variable of distance from the eye in which
we can list a series of proximal "distance cues" (retinal disparity, convergence,
accommodation, etc.), any of these variables can be intended as the cue
distance. In other words, at times some of these variables may be present
whereas others may not. Second, it is not possible to deduce with certainty
the nature of the distal variable from a specific pattern of proximal stimulation.
Using the same example, retinal disparity is normally the result of differences
in depth but can also be produced in a laboratory under artificial conditions.
As a result, there is uncertainty in predicting proximal effects. Finally, some
proximal cues vary systematically more than others as a function of distal
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stimulus changes. Hence, the degree of covariation between a proximal cue
and a distal property defines the ecological validity of the proximal cue with
respect to that property. Variations in ecological validity may again be
illustrated in terms of proximal cues to distance (for example retinal disparity
tends to be in close correspondence with distance and thus has high ecological
validity as a cue to distance). As a summary, since the ecological validities
are less than perfect, the relationship between the distal variable and its
proximal mediators can be described as one of probable partial causes and
probable partial effects.
2. Proximal effects and perceptual response.
In the process of adjusting to distal events, the organism uses any
kind of proximal cues that are available to it. In the face of cues of limited
validity, the organism must adopt a probabilistic strategy or a strategy of
posits. Taking action in this way the organism can use altogether different
proximal cues or combinations of cues. Because flexibility in the utilization
of cues is essential to adjustment, the pattern of cues produced by a given
distal object is variable. Finally and for a substantial accomplishment in
adjustment different cues must be weighted by the organism in agreement
with their validity. Therefore, the psychologist must determine the ecological
validity of different proximal cues and their weight as assigned by the
organism.
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3. Distal variable and perceptual response.
The relationship between two focal variables, viz. distal variable
and perceptual response is a measure of the organism's perceptual achieve-
ment (Brunswik, 1952). When the organism is successfol the dhstal variable
may be considered to have been "functionally attained. " If we want to
determine the degree of attainment we can correlate distal (physical) value
with perceptual response. This correlation is a measure of the functional
validity of the perceptual response. As the perceptual thing-cons fancies
demonstrates functional validity is normally high, though by no means perfect
(Postman and Tolman, 1959). This kind of imperfection is a consequence of
the environmental uncertainties with which the organism must contend and
in which the association between distal and proximal events is probable rather
than certain. Absolute evidence of perceptual achievement is in principle
impossible for an organism that depends on proximal cues. However the
greater source of error in perceptual achievement rests in undependable
object-cue relationships rather than in the interference of available cues
(see Figure 9).
3. Relevancy of the lens model for behavioral achievement.
An example that may lead to a better understanding of the application
of the lens model in behavioral achievement is described here (Brunswik,
1952; Tolman, 1932; Postman and Tolman, 1959):
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Uncertainty of causal I in);ages obtains in molarbehavior just as it does in perception. No single habitor group of habits is imiformly associated with the
initial condition of hunger. The correlation of means
and ends equally falls short of perfection. There isprobable rather than invariant relationship between
any specific bodily action and the achivement of the
end state, thus the organism will shift to an alternative
one and continue to so until the end state is achieved.
Just as proximal cues are weighted and utilized
according to their '’assumed" probabilities, so
alternative actions are performed according to
expected ’ probabilities of success.
The emphasis on the use of alternative means in the
achievement of an end is closely related to Tolman's
definition of purpose as persistence and docility of
oehavior with respect to some end. A description of
behavior as purposive in Tolman's sense is thoroughly
consistent with Brunswik’s pervasive interest in the
adaptive properties of behavior.
The applications of the lens model to behavioral
achievement is as yet fragmentary and lacks the
specificity of analysis of perceptual achievement.
In illustrating the potential applicability of the model
we have chosen as the focal variable an initial
condition of deprivation and the end state of need
reduction. The relationship between these variables
was treated independently of the specific physical
situation, and the analysis bypassed the interaction
between perceptual and behavioral achievement. This
later interaction would have to receive extensive
attention in the further development of probabilistic
functionalism (p. 514).
CHAPTER VI
SYSTEMATIC DESIGN AND REPRESENTATIVE DESIGN
Historical and metatheorolical consider^™,,
TWO major considers are necessary to an exact understanding
Of psychology's historical context:
1. From the very beginning, psychologists have been aware that a
problem exists concerning the scientific status of their discipline. Although
a distinct consideration of the complexity of cause-effect relations runs
parallel to an awareness of the need for scientific methodology as illustrated
by the progressive improvement in scientific research from early Greek
times to the Nineteenth Century, commitment to a given method has often
obscured the need to cope with complexity by other means (Crombie, 1959).
Only toward the end of the first half of the twentieth century did the first
decisive break with this tradition occur. This rupture has been considered
important enough to be called a scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1962).
2. Historically, psychology's basic method has been to follow the
classical design which dictates that experiment in such a way that all variables
but one are controlled. The effects of that variable can thus be assessed
independently of confusing influences. Scientists have felt so compelled to
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use this special kind of experimental model that it has been called a classical
paradigm. 1
However, though the idea of paradigm is basic to experimental
methodology, it seems clear through an historical analysis that it represents
an historical choice rather than an inevitable technique, m other words,
perhaps it is not so obvious that it is not the only way to carry out psychological
experiments as e.g., ethologists have many times carried out experiments
using a "watch and wonder" approach.
lr
rwo additional considerations on "design" and "paradigm" are
important here:
(a) "The two tj^pes of design are juxtaposed here in conformity with a
distmction established by Brunswik (Brunswik, 1947). in the sense in which
he uses the terms "representative design" he refers to the transfer of the
principles of sampling statistics from the subjects of a psychological
investigation to the objects or situations which constitute the stimuli in the
investigation. The arbitrary orderliness with which these external (independent)
variables are customarily handled is summarized by Brunswile under the
opposite heading of "systematic design, " and Fisher’s factorial design is
presented as a relatively recent and relatively complex example. Fisher
has also used the term "systematic" in a similar, albeit somewhat causal,
manner" (Hammond, 1954, p. 150).
(b) A paraejigm is a term applied to a model (meaning para—beside
and digm to show) designed to stimulate research questions, develop a
methodology for gathering and classifying data, and secure standards necessary
for evaluating accumulated evidence. Various paradigms exist in psychology,
such as behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and topological psychology (Jones and
Gerard, 1967).
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The role of the paradigm in srictipp
Paradigms are used in science to describe the fact that "some accepted
examples of scientific practice-examples which include law, theory,
application, and instrumentatlon-provide models from which evolve particular
coherent traditions of scientific research" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 10). A paradigm
is thus methodological as well as theoretical: "Paradigm procedures and
applications are necessary to science as paradigm laws and theories, and
they have the same effect" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 60). The paradigm serves a
useful function in the progress of science by providing a means for guiding
research within a coherent framework. By means of the paradigm, a
certain randomness is removed from scientific effort and direction is given
in chosing problems for scientific attention and determining the method of this
investigation. But if paradigms guide, they also impose restructions
:
"Inevitably they restrict the phenomenical field accessible for scientific
study at any given time.
. . A paradigm can even insulate the community from
those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form,
because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools
the paradigm supplies" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 37). This description of scientific
paradigms shows quite well the functioning of psychology's principal
methodological paradigm, the systematic design. The method was adopted
by a young field of psychology "hungry for scientific respectibability"
(Loch, 1959), and accepted as an answer to the problems of that field because
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it was judged sufficient to meet the standards of science.
The changing of paradigms in science
A major problem with scientific paradigms is that, because they
satisfy a scientific exigency, once implanted they are difficult to change. But
as previously noted, as important as paradigms can be, they can also be
changed by means of scientific revolutions. Such revolutions start when
' some awareness of an anomaly or a discrepancy between the paradigm and
the requirements of the real world is experienced.
. . Discovery commences
with the awareness of anomaly, that is, with the recognition that nature has
somehow violated the paradigm
-induced expectations that govern normal
science (Kuhn, 1962, p. 52). We have seen in Brunswik T s critical work on
Sensory psychology and Gestalt that the systematic design paradigm does not
fit the need of modern psychology. Another example of this anamoly is
also given by Brunswik in his comments on Psychoanalysis (Brunswik, 1938).
In Brunswik’s words, Freud provides an example of this sort of anomaly.
Although Freud did not make any direct methodological contribution he
recognized that a carefully controlled stimulus could provoke various responses
and that the same response could result from various stimuli. Thus, this
emphasis on vicarious functioning can be considered the major contribution
of psychoanalysis to psychology. In short, diagnosis is endowed with all
the characteristics of probabilistic inference.
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A second characteristic of scientific paradigms is that revolutiona^
change is aiways followed hy a new indentation ".
. . the decision t0 reject
one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and
the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms
with nature and with each other.
.
. To reject one paradigm without
simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself" (Kuhn, 1962,
pp. 77-79).
Brunswik1s contribution to the changing of paradise
Brunswik's desire was to bring the anomaly into focus again and to
suggest that psychology must recognize it and propose some solution. Brunswik
points out that "only scattered recognition had been given to the fact that
object-cue and means-end relationships are not in accord with the mathematical
certainty built into the so-called laws of nature, but are rather of the
character of probability relationships (Brunswik, 1943, p. 260). For Brunswik
the recognition of the probabilistic character of the causal relationships in
the environment demanded a "fundamental all inclusive shift in our methodological
ideology regarding psychology" (Brunswik, 1943, p. 261). If the organism has
to deal with the uncertainty of nature we can learn more about its behavior by
representing it experimentally, with the same sort of probabilistic environ-
ment that is inherent in nature. If an isolated variable does not exist outside
the laboratory we cannot force the organism to deal with it inside the laboratory.
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As Brunswik asserts it cau be shown that classical design does not succeed
“ °£ cont“" ‘o psychology" (Brunswik, 1943, p. 263) as he
did not accept the inevitability of experimental isolation. Brunswik was
anxious to deal with nature as it presents itself to the behavioral organism
to the study of pure causes, artificially separated from disturbing influences,
can only be relevant for the physical sciences, not for the main object of
psychological enterprise.
From the previous considerations we can come to some fundamental
conclusions regarding the relevance that the theoretical orientation of
probabilistic functionalism as a paradigm has for psychological methodology.
First of all, the analysis of organismic achievement cannot be carried out
within the boundaries of experiments that are rooted in the exact control and
isolation of variables. Second, organismic achievement must be studied in
situations that are representative of the subject's natural habitat. And
third, systematic design has to be replaced by representative design in the
same way that general laws implied in classical experiments must be
replaced by statistical generalizations, i. e.
,
the probabilistic approach.
Experimental desig„s2 may be evaluated with respect to the following
criteria (Boring, 1929; Cattelli, 1966; Plutehik, !968; Sidowski, 1966):
(a) choice of variables; (b) manner of variation of the variables chosen and
(c) manner of covariation of the variables chosen.
(a) Choice of variables.
The basic decision here is in choosing the number of variables for
investigation in a given design. In classical experimental psychology, the
almost perfect pattern was the one-variable model. 3 One variable was
considered at a time while all other variables either were held constant or
were assumed to be irrelevant. With the introduction of ANOVA
4
there has
riof .
“ may be useful to P°tot out again that classical experimental design
and ' t
6
d
^ e^Perlmenta^ testing of hypothesis in regard to the dependence
T °f
VarlaMeS
- With tUs ktad of dc^gn it is possible to
calculate the effects o one or more independent variables on one or more
ependent variables, to general, experimental design refers to measures
adopted to ensure that the planning and procedure of an experiment use all
available appropriate information and as far as possible take into account
all the implicated factors.
3All this description rests heavily on the Postman and Tolman
account (Postman and Tolman, 1959, p. 514 ff).
4ANOVA (analysis of variance) is a method for determining whether
the differences—expressed as a variance—found in a dependent variable,
when it is exposed to the influence of one or more experimental variables,
exceeds what may be expected by chance. The F test is a measure of the
probability of the difference beyond chance. Each variable in turn can be
treated as the dependent variable. See also Appendix A for a definition of
the same term.
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been a tendency toward tnulUvartate design. 5 The nuffiber ot variables tacludcd
in any one systematic design has, however, remained small both for practical
considerations and because of the difficulties in integrating higher-ortcr
interactions.
The choice of variables also embodies decisions with respect to
regional reference (Brunswik, 1939). As we have shown previously there is
in the History of Psychology a constant prejudice toward central and proximal
events while concern with distal variables is of more recent origin. The
study of distal variables calls for multivariate designs, since distal achieve-
ment usually depends on a multiplicity of factors rather than on a single one.
(b) Manner of variation of the variables chosen.
In a classical systematic experiment, the evaluation of the variable
of variables is limited to a restricted range. Within this range, the values
are usually spaced in even, discrete steps, e. g. , a set of weights or sizes
differing from each other by equal amounts. Values of other variables that
can be considered as potential determinants of the response under investigation
are either held constant at some finite value or reduced to zero (Postman and
Tolman, 1959).
5
Multivariate design is complemented by a multivariate analysis that
uses in turn any of the methods or techniques (such as multiple
-factor
analysis and analysis of covariance) that are employed to identify, or show
the effect of, many variables when acting together.
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(c) Manner of covariation
Experimental control determines not only the manner cl variation ol
each individual variable but also the nature of covariation, among variables.
Within the limits of systematic design there are three methods of controlling
coverxation, namely, the artificial tying of variables, the artificial inter-
locking of variables and the artificial untying of variables.
Three examples clearly illustrate each type of controlling coveriation
,
for die first type we can use the measurement of length discrimination on the
Galton bar, 6 for the second type the constancy experiments, 7 and for the
third one Brunswik's example on social perception. The first is representative
of an experiment under highly controlled conditions
-maximal tying of variables-
m which psychophysics and measurement tend to become indistinguishable.
The second is an example of how coveriation can be present but restricted in
range, in which case it is considered an artificial interlocking of variables.
In Brunswik's example (Brunswik, 1956), individuals whose personality traits
were to be judged were required to wear the same clothes and assume identical
0The GaIton bar is an instrument invented by Sir Francis Gallon (1822-
1911) for measuring thresholds (limens) of visual distances by having
the subject try to match a standard line to a movable line; used in psycho-
physics for determining average error or barely noticeable differences.
r>
See also the terms "constancy" and "perceptual constancy" in
Appendix A.
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postures at each interview. This was done to avoid differences in judgments,
since control was achieved only at the expense of eliminating whatever
correlation naturally obtained between the interaction of clothing habits and
muscular tonus on the one hand and personality traits on the other.
Advantages of Brunswik's representative design
The basic goal of representative design is on the one hand to reflect
the probabilistic nature of environmental circumstances and on the other
to show the complete measure of the organism's capacity to manage the
environmental uncertainties. These goals are achieved by the representative
sampling of ecological situations.
An ecology is a cluster of situations that the organism is likely to
find in daily living (Postman, 1955). 8 An ecology is described independently
of the organism’s responses and is therefore an objective account of the
stimuli and behavior supports that may be presented to the organism by the
environment. These characteristics, called ecological variables, are
considered most representative of the organism's survival. The manipulation
of such characteristics is distinctive of systematic design, while representa-
tive design refuses to interfere with environmental situations. But sampling
of situations refers neither to the sampling of variables, but fundamentally to
g
See the term "ecology" in Appendix A.
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the fact that there is a whole ecology interacting with a whole organism. 9
Brunswik was the first psychologist to take the probabilistic point of
view. This attitude had two important advantages. First of all the fact that
the probabilistic view arose directly and logically from his theoretical and
empirical positions (Brunswik, 1952). Nowhere had Brunswik made a prior
judgment as to whether technical problems could or could not be overcome.
Actually he admits that his approach presents even more serious technical
difficulties than the conventional approach. Looking for statistical laws
does not, therefore constitute a withdrawal from technical problems; rather
it proceeds directly out of propositions different from those accepted by
classical behaviorists concerning the interaction of the organism and its
environment. Secondly, as Brunswik suggested (Brunswik, 1943), uniformities
or invariances would not be found by psychologists. On the contrary, he
affirmed that survival may be defined as the establishment of permanent
interrelationships with the environment. In Bmnswik’s terminology,
A study about the influences of Goldstein’s organismic psychology
on Brunswik’s probabilism has not yet been done although similar views
can be found in both Brunswik and Goldstein. Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965)
is a psychologist well known for Iris theory of personality of an organismic
and holistic nature, with an overlay of Gestalt influences; he claimed that
the only motive in life is to actualize oneself.
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(1) invariances are to be found between scientific constructs in the distal
region of the environment and the central region of the organism, and (2) the
probability lies in the mediaUonal processes of the physical world-from the
surface of the environment to its remote causal layers-and in the mediaUonal
processes of the organism-from the surface of the organism to its central
layers.
Luckily Brunswik did not withdraw from the methodological implications
of his theoretical position, however burdensome it may have appeared.
Because Brunswik's view of the histoiy of psychology and its conceptual
framework guided his methodological strength, all these aspects of his work
constituted a functional whole. Beginning with an historical and conceptual
analysis Brunswik was forced to look closely into psychological methodology
and there he found that classical methods were not consistent with the history
of psychology in the twentieth century. Thus he developed some methodological
principles, deriving them from his general outlook. In doing this he
accomplished two valuable tasks: first, he provided psychology with a
detailed and systematic methodological body, and second, he supplied a fresh
methodology not derived from the traditional canons of logic or from the
natural sciences (Brunswik, 1947, 1956). In other words, Brunswile perceived
that although Nature was in some sense regular and could be described in
terms of nomothetic laws of physics this aspect of regularity was not
immediately available to the behaving organism. Thus, the functionalistic
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approach in psychology must take into account this basic limitation of the
adjustive apparatus, and must link behavior and environment statistically
rather than by placing the predominant stress on physic's laws.
Last remarks on Brunswik's statistical analysis
In realizing the probabilistic nature of the environment and behavioral
laws, psychology necessarily becomes a statistical discipline. In the
particular context of Brunswik's functionalism this attitude took on a refine-
ment that is clearly contrasted with the methods of systematic design and
differential psychology. The statistical analysis in systematic experiments
aims to hold constant the differences among individuals, independent of the
controlled changes in the environment. In differential psychology, the major
task is to hold the environmental conditions oonstant and focus on the analysis
of individual differences. Thus the quest for representativeness runs
parallel with the development of mental testing. 10 But the last concern is
with representative samples of individuals rather than of situations.
Differential psychology enriches its own analysis of variability with the
10The mental testing movement began with the development of the
first intelligence test by Binet and Simon in 1905. The test sprang from the
purely practical goal of discovering an objective method of assessing the
intellectual level of French school children. The Binet-Simon scale was
developed around a theoretical framework involving three main conceptions
of the nature of intelligence: (1) a goal or direction to the mental processes
involved, (2) the ability to show adaptable solutions, (3) the capacity to show
selectivity of judgments and self criticism of choices. In attempting to
measure these processes, Binet and Simon constructed their test from items
of common information, word definitions, reasoning items, ingenuity tests,
and the like.
77
analysis of covariation, like differential psychology, probabilistic functionalism
also used the correlation coefficient but there is an important difference
between both issues, namely, that in moving from differential psychology to
the functionalist analysis of achievement, individuals and situations change
positions. Thus the correlations are now between the objective characteristics
of situations as well as between the objective characteristics and responses
of the organism.
The correlation coefficient is used to measure the degree of dependence
among environmental events and as a result provides the psychologist with
intra-ecological correlations. The degree of association between distal
variables and proximal cues is of special interest in dealing with perceptual
achievement. The correlation between distal and proximal values of a
stimulus is a measure of the ecological validity of the proximal cues. The
accurate description of ecological conditions depends on the stability of the
physical measures of the environmental characteristics. The correlation
between successive measurements of an environmental stimulus establishes
the ecological reliability of that simulus. As a result of all these operations,
ecologically reliable features endow the organism with stable data for its
near orientation.
Some final words on perceptual achievement and statistical techniques
are necessary. The fundamental measure of perceptual achievement is the
correlation between the distal value and the attained value of a stimulus.
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This correlation measures the functional validity of the perceptaal response,
once the functional validity of the individual's response has been fixed, the
psychologist can look for the reliability of that response. If he wants to
measure intra-observation reliability he directs the same individual to
respond repeatedly to a given sample of situations, and then determines the
correlations among that series of responses. If he wants to move from one
individual to a set of subjects, he can obtain responses to the same sample
from this increased population. The correlation among their responses
measures intraindividual observational reliability. Tins problem, which
actually falls outside the aim of functionalistic analysis, refers more to
generalizations among individuals rather than situations. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to remember that the search for complete differences between
subjects is consistent with the premises of representative design.
CHAPTER VII
SOME BRUNSWIKIAN APPROACHES USED IN
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
The regional reference and educational research
Sections I and II presented a broad picture of how a classification of
variables in terms of their remoteness from the central processes of a
behaving organism works in Brunswik’s system. Looking also at the
representative picture given there we see that, the variables acting upon the
organism’s behavior lie in regions increasingly and symmetrically peripheral
to the central response. A choice of variables representing all regions was
understood as forming a causal chain, the links of which are probabilistically,
rather than deterministically, related. The educational research inspired by
Brunswik's system has been carried out, however, with some important
modifications (Snow, 1968; Foa, 1961, 1962). First of all a statistical model
was sought not for one organism but for many—a teacher and one or more
students interacting in a classroom. Second a single sample was chosen as
a forerunner of the more complex research to follow; Brunswik's regional
reference was restricted to the case of one teacher and one student. Figures
10 and 11 show the regions bearing upon both teacher and student and supply
Longitudinal
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Fig. 10. The regional reference of psychological svstems
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some examples of variables existing in each region. Third, remote
antecedents and achievement variables were defined operationally by test,
questionnaire and rating scale responses. These are the so-called macro-
criteria measurements of teacher effectiveness (Gage, 1963, 1964). The
inside regions represent micro-criteria of teaching and learning usually
quantified by means of classroom observation (Medley and Mitzel, 1963).
The lens model and educational research
Section I I described the main features of the regional reference and
probabilistic relations among events appearing in Brunswik’s fundamental
instrument, the lens model. Figures 12 to 15 depict several kinds of lens
models adapted from Brunswik by later researchers who were looking for
a distinction between the various aspects of the perceptual and behavioral
processes. Thus Figure 12 illustrates the essential qualities of human
vicarious functioning. Cues relating some stimulus variables—i. e.
,
the
size of a distant object are available from the ecology as an array of
projections on the subject's sensorial apparatus which is depicted as a
convex lens. These projections are focused to produce a central response
(in the example quoted the responses is a size judgment). The correlation
between the initial and terminal size variables, estimated for a single
subject over a number of naturalistically varying situations, reveals the
functional validity of size judgment calculated for a subject. Estimated
correlations between the distal variable and each cue separately supplies
83
VICARIOUS MEDIATION
Fig. 12. The lens model (Brunswik, 1952) and a
double lens Todel (Leeper, 1966).
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statements o£ ecological validity for each cue; those estimated between
individual cues and the judgmental response supply cue utiU Zatio„ coefficient.
Multiple correlational, and other species of multivariate, analysis can also
be used, (1) to represent criterion variables in terms of weighted combinations
of cue variables; (2) to Interrelate established or predicted criterion variables
and (3) to investigate dimensions and patterns among cue variables. Any of
these coefficients may vary systematically from person to person, or for
the same person under different conditions, but will always be less than
unity due to the probabilistic character of natural behavior (Snow, 1968).
Brunswik’s representative sampling of actual learning situations in other
settings allows research on teaching to deal with the difficulties of natural
behavior inside the classroom. Thus some authors (Leeper, 1966) have
further developed Brunswik’s model into a double-lens form pointing to both
receptor and motor aspects of a subject’s behavior. Others (Hammond,
Hursch and Todd, 1964) have drawn another sort of double-lens model for
investigating the nature of clinical inference. 1 The important feature here
is that two subjects are involved but the stream of information is only in one
direction, namely, from the observed, through various tests scores and
other cues, to observer, Another invention has been a single-lens model
^See Figures 12 and 13.
85
Observed
Distal
Trait
Observer
Inferred Inferred
Proximal" Cues "Proximal" Distal
Traits Traits Trait
/% = /V>*/
tndex of Matching
Fig. 13. A lens model of clinical inference (Hammond,
Hursch, and Todd, 1964) and a lens model of
interjudge comparison (Naylor and Schenck, 1966).
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for comparing two judgments of a response (Naylor and Schenk, 1966). 2
Naylor and Schenk's picture shows the kind of distinct correlational indices
that are available from data prepared in the lens model frame.
On teacher-student interaction
The models described in the previous pages are relevant to an
analysis done by the classroom observer. However a model for teacher-
student interaction presents some difficulties in its adaptation. First of all,
the interpersonal cue variable must be given great significance in the study of
teaching action in classroom behavior (see Figure 13). These cues mediate
communication between the teacher and the student. But problems are evident
here, as the teacher’s "proximal" traits—dispositions, intended meanings,
etc. —may be imperfectly represented at the student focal point, and student
internal activity and attention may not be fully transmitted to the teacher.
Second, it is also important for theoretical purposes that the model lead to
ideographic rather than nomothetic research. In operational terms, this
means that the variables included in teacher-student interaction have to be
studied longitudinally with single teachers in their various teaching situations,
as they vary over a number of teaching situations ordered in a time series,
i.e., minutes, days, weeks or years, or teaching cycles, lessons, courses,
2
See Figure 14.
Teacher
Fig.
14.
Circuit-lens
of
Teacher-student
classroom
showing
central,
proximal,
and
distal
levels
of
longitudinal
analysis
(Snow,
1967).
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etc. The main purposes are: (1) to study variation in cues across units,
(2) to discover natural organization within these variables and (3) to relate
these fundamental behavioral characteristics to the subjects involved.
Following Snow’s expositions (Snow, 1968) it is possible to quantify various
behavioral characteristics of a single teacher—i.e.
,
the use of gestures,
vocal tone changes, emotion-laden words, etc.—as they occur in videotape
recordings of teaching cycles, and to relate these to similar recordings of
student behavior in the same setting. It is also possible to assess groups,
factors, or other systematic patterns of teacher-student variables. These
sorts of variables may also be related to uniformity collected physiological
data, self ratings of attitudes or observer ratings of various teacher qualities
such as anxiety, warmth, preparation, motivation, etc. Such groups of data
are represented as proximal traits. As Snow explains "historically, research
on teaching has sought to move from more general variables found in the
outer, distal regions toward or across the inner central regions of specific
classroom behavior. Attempts to construct such relationships have met
with limited success, perhaps because of aland of "principle of correlation
distance" (Snow, 1968, p. 482). The farther apart two variables arc from
each other in terms of regional reference, the greater the number of
probabilistic connections that must be bridged between them and, hence,
the lower the correlation. It lias been contended that the teacher s personal
characteristics and student test performance have been particularly difficult
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to assess because cue variables and proximal traits have been left out ol the
probabilistic chain. However some coherence beyond that time has been
found in the characteristics of teachers and students that can be taken as
indices of individual differences. This is of course in combination with data
from corresponding analysis on other teachers or students that can be related
to other personal characteristics or experimental variables (See Figure 15).
In short: (a) microanalysis of teaching acts may be connected with more
macroanalysis supporting conceptions of teachers and students as persons
engaged in psychological development outside the classroom; (b) differences
between subjects in this sort of analysis may be used to evaluate the effects
of previous experimental variables imposed, for example, in a teacher
training program. Thus while the proposed methodology is basically
correlational, it allows the effects of training treatments on single dependent
variables to be traced out into the multivariate context of real classroom
behavior.
Representative design and educational research
Internal validity, external validity, population validity
and ecological validity in educational research.
In looking for the possible limitations in the validity of educational
experiments some authors (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Bracht and Glass,
1968) have made accurate distinctions between internal validity and external
validity. Hence, the stronger research that has been done on the latter two
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Fig. 15. Data matrices relevant
proposed analyses (Seibert and Snow, 1965)
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kinds of problems, namely population validity and ecological validity, have
been concerned with external validity. In studies dealing with population
validity it is possible to explore issues involving generalization from specific
examples, the use of experimentally treated populations of students and the
possibility that personal characteristics might be mutually influenced by
experimental variables that can restrict generalizations about treatment
effects. In problems dealing with ecological validity it is possible to study
descriptions of independent variables, multiple treatment interference,
experimenter effects, pretest and post-test results, measurement of
dependent variables, history and treatment interaction, etc.
External validity and representativeness in
educational research.
There are two main problems in dealing with external validity. One
is that the experiment does not cover the essentials of behavior obtained in
research, and the other is that the experiment does not always constitute
the most accurate instrument for describing this behavior as it really is.
Only this relationship termed "representative validity" by Egon Brunswik
applies as it did in psychology to modem educational research, correcting
the deficiencies of external validity.
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Representative validity, representative design
and research on learning in school and
laboratory settings
In Brunswik’s view psychological investigation in the laboratory
removes perceptual variables from the context of nature. If, for example,
we study two cue variables for size perception as correlated with the normal
external world, they cannot be treated adequately in an experimental laboratory
setting that considers them independently and relies on orthogonal factorial
designs. This pattern is, in Brunswik's words artificial and directed to
systematic design and molecular reductionistic goals. On the other hand,
representative design is molar, functional, probabilistic and adjusted to
real environmental locations. In accordance with these premises—which
also work well in educational research presentations— Brunswik worked out
some correlational methods to describe the behavior of subjects in perceptual
constancy experiments and also sometimes used his subjects in attempts to
probe various mental attitudes in making perceptual judgments. The subjects
were—as previously noted—behaving naturally while experimenters practiced
only a sort of noninvolvement control. All this ultimately means in Brunswik’s
opinion that (1) human beings are intelligent, active, flexible and adaptable;
(2) human beings are able to operate on the basis of information from a
probabilistic environment and (3) any methodology that treats of human subjects
must cope with all these factors rather than trying to adapt selected factors to
an artificial design.
93
The representative design in educational research.
The concept of representative design has never been developed in
educational experiments. Many authors on educational research (Campbell,
1957, Bracht, 1970, et al.) have quoted Brunswik's conceptualizations, but
almost none has gone further with them. One important reason may be that
most educational experiments are carried on in schools and thus are believed
to be ipso facto representative. But this is only one reason; another is that
educational experiments must actually be representative. To make them so,
some of those psychologists who look more to biology rather than to physics
m constructing a scientific operative model have stressed the value of
ecologically oriented research in psychology, as have other authors (Cattell,
1966; Sells, 1966; Perebom, 1971) in constructing educational designs.
Usually educational experiments are carried out under the systematic design
pattern, so that only a few independent variables are controlled and what the
learner really absorbs in the meaning is disregarded. In Brunswik's
terminology we would say that most educational experiments are not externally
or ecologically valid.
The nature of generability: external validity
in educational experiments
In treating of population validity, three degrees of conceptualization
may be considered in deducting from empirical data: First, generalization
from the observed sample of students to the vavailable population from which
it was derived; second, generalization from the available population to the
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target population with which one is finally concerned; third, translation into
intelligible terms of the meaning of the generalization in relation to the
events being studied. Note that the first two degrees of generalization are
statistical based on a random sampling of shidents from populations. The
sample is then considered representative of the ultimate target population.
However, random sampling is rarely attained in the first instance and never
in the second. Usually, neither population is even adequately defined or
described. Nevertheless, the researcher need not be especially troubled
by these progressive statistical operations, especially in the first instance
(Lindquist, 1953; Cornfield and Tukey, 1956; Bracht and Glass, 1968).
Generalization can proceed, for example, from this first sample to a hypo-
thetical population assumed to have similar characteristics. The key to
generalization in the first and second degrees is in the description of student
characteristics.
Treatment effects and generalization
When outstanding significant characteristics of learners are sampled
in a limited way, research generalization actually reveals itself to be doubtful.
To cope with the problems that appear in the process, namely, the treatment
effects, a new tool has been developed in the ATI or aptitude-treatment-
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r ction. Some of its applications have been done in the field of aptitude
for learning, while others have been In the broader field of instructional
progress. A proper representative design in relationship to population
validity would be one in which random sampling of the subjects was done with
extreme care and posterior reliability. As is well known, almost all empirical
education studies omit this and, thus, the only recourse is to go ahead
employing detailed descriptions of the populations and samples as well as the
testing of interactions. Using special care in this regard, description and
analysis can be carried out indicating some of these relevant and dependent
variables: sex, age, I.Q., previous research on the subjects, etc. In
Snow's opinion (Cronbach and Snow, 1969), this sort of study is quasi-
representative in relationship to population characteristics. Of course
exercising with the personal characteristics of the subjects makes "statistical
analysis untidy and may weaken it, since classical factorial design and analysis
of variance may be compromised or lost in the process surplanted by
regression methods, path analysis and other incompletely developed correlational
3The topics of cognitive style and aptitude-treatment interaction (ATI)
have recently interested many educational psychologists and educational
researchers. In 1957, Cronbach stated that "Ultimately we should design
treatment, not to fit the average person, but to fit groups of students with
particular aptitude patterns. Conversely, we should seek out the aptitudes
which correspond to (interact with) modifiable aspects of the treatment"
(Cronbach, 1957, 671-684).
approaches" (Snow, 1973, p. i0) . But the
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one that has to be accepted for the
contradiction between methods is
research.
present in the evolution of educational
Ecological validity and quasi-representativeness
Ecological validity reiers to the property inherent in habitats or
situations selected for an experiment as being representative of the situations
about which the investigator intends to generalise (Brunswik, 1956; Cronbach
and alt.
, 1972). In ecological validity, as previously mentioned in the
instances of population validity, treatments are sampled from "a target
universe of treatments, whether the investigator recogrtzes this explicitly or
not. And one can conceive of intermediate accessible universes of treatment
as, for example, the teachers in a given school, or the subject matter with
Which a particular investigator is familiar" (Snow, 1973, p. 11 ). However
treatments have rather different features, each from the other. For instance
in a sample of treatments those of experimental interest vary as do others
with many peculiarities as well. Some of these will often interact with those
being studied forgetting that one of the present basic aims of experimental
research has to be the control of the extraneous variables. Isolation and
orthogonalization of key variables in factorial design and the assessment of
their independent effects by analysis of variance has been the common strategy
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in conducting educational research experiments. Hence some student
characteristics constitute a series o£ continuous variables whose treatment
is continuous, but, paradoxically, the systematic experiment holds only a
few treatment conditions. In summary, no progress has been made in studying
the dimensionality of instructional treatments and no taxonomy is available
similar to the ones used to characterize student differences. We rarely have
an idea of how the subjects see themselves, neither how they would be
described in multivariate objective observations made during the experiment.
We need a representative design of ecological validity sampled from the
universe of treatments that is to be the target for future generalizations. But
since this is rarely possible there is no recourse but to make a detailed
description of the universe being studied, and try a sample of treatments and
hen test the interactions. Quasi-representative design directed to treatment
characteristics demands methods that permit these characteristics to covary
as they do in nature.
Referent generality and external value
of experiments.
The term "referent generality" is used to point out the range of freedom
in a possible experimental outcome measured in a given study. While stressing
the fact that students and their experimental treatment must be characterized
by many dimensions, some authors insist on the necessity of treating learning
outcome as multivariate. While in Brunswik’s opinion analyses can be
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carried out in terns of the concept of the regional reference of psychological
variables, educational experiments are used to deal only with the measure
of immediate achievement in fields such as memory, reasoning, etc. Hence,
the value of referent generality of an experiment should refer to the spread
of the effect, the number of anticipated outcomes and their influence on
pervasive characteristics of the subjects. The educational investigator in
"referent generality" may select a sample of dependent measures to represent
several regions of reference. We are now familiar with the possibility of
applying Brunswik's regional classification of variables to teacher- student
interaction, m Figure 16, we see the possible spread of effect of treatment
to more distal outcomes with increasing referent generality.
Changing from the representative to
quasi-representative settings.
It appears, in Snow’s words (Snow, 1973, p. 14) that "true representative
design, while perhaps attainable in some fields of research, is largely
unattainable in educational experiments. The only thing we can do is to
reach a sort of compromise between ecological imperatives and representative-
ness. In checking all the alternatives exposed until now, it seems reasonable
to move from systematic to more representative designs (Campbell and
Stanley, 1963). This move can be ordered in the following steps:
1. From laboratory to school . In the search for representativeness
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Staadard exponents should move as unobtrusive,y4 ^ posslble ^
school rooms in an attempt to be representative of the environment and the
usual stream of everyday events.
2- Systematic replications
..
Any investigator conducting his systematic
experiment in two or more places is carrying out a systematic replication.
He may vary only the subjects, looking for additional population representative-
ness. He may also vary teachers, methods, context and material to be
learned, looking for larger ecological representativeness. However, while
replication supplies a significant step toward generalization, it is not in
itself sufficient.
3
* iStraexperiinent observation. Some questions arise on what the
subjects are actually doing during the experiment, how they perceive the
experimental treatment and how it affects them. The results of several
experiments strongly suggest that investigators should take detailed accounts
of what occupies the subject's thoughts during the experiment. But the
traditional emphasis in systematic design has been on events at the boundaries
of the experiment, neglecting the events occurring within the pretest and the
4
Unobtrusive measures (also called non-reactive measures) refer to
social sciences research data not obtained by interview or questionnaire.
They intend to set up a new method against the overdependence upon a single,
iallible and weak one. They stress also the necessity for a multiple
ope rationism, a collection of methods combined to avoid sharing this weakness
(Webb, Campbell, Schwarts, et al.
,
1965).
100posttest situations. There Is always the possibility of adcUng a control groUp
while allowing the subject group to behave in its characteristic way.
4. Additional experimental observation
. Additional observation is a
farther move toward representativeness. A large number of experiments are
carried on without consideration for the context in which they exist. For
example, material to be learned in the experiment is not continuous with the
subject matter of the course, some experimental conditions are more
disruptive than others for some subjects, etc. Some solutions would include:
(a) to observe such situations and detect disturbing effects, including
novelty; (b) to describe quantitatively the social context in winch the experiment
is carried out; (c) to explore the recent past and the instructional and social
history of the students and the classroom situation. All these features add
valuable information on ecological representativeness.
5 * Preparation of students
. The representativeness of an experiment
is intensified if the learner’s behavior is adapted to a task as similar as
possible to tasks that are typical of the ordinary school learning situation.
Brunwsik’s establishment of different attitudes in the perceptual process is
an example of the use of preparation in experiments. One might, for instance,
train some groups of learners to function systematically in different ways
during educational experiments in which other groups remain free to make
their usual approaches to learning. These kinds of experiments may also
help to clarify the kinds of artificial behavior that appear in systematic
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design, thus stressing the value of the representative ones.
6- Continuum of treatment
. The duration of instructional treatment
has to be determined using time samples of sufficient length. As is well
known, there tend to be experiments in which the subjects are exposed to
learning material for only a few minutes. The longer the treatment, the
broader the experimental effects and in relation to extraneous influences.
These effects, however, are to some extent more beneficial in the context
of Brunswikian representative design inasmuch as they can render the
experimental treatment more similar to the natural situation of school learning.
Some of the benefits of a longer time element are (a) repetitive application
of treatment and (b) increased number of occasions on which criterion
measurements can be obtained.
Sampling experimental effects.
As illustrated in Figures 16 and 17, there is a wide range of possible
measures for an investigator to consider in drawing up his dependent variables.
First of all, his choice will be based partly on his experimental conditions
and what primarily influences them, and partly on the economy of research.
Secondly, it may also depend on some theoretical conception of the texture
of the framework of causal relationships concerning the phenomenon with which
we are dealing. If the researcher can build hypothesized chains or sequences
of effects, and/or perhaps alternative chains, he can sample representatively
attitude
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Fig. 17. Schematic scales of copulation and ecological
representativeness in instructional experi-
ments ( Snow, 1973 ).
•cologicsl
covariation
allowed
and
studied
quantitatively
104from the assembly of possible variables settled along the chain. The cluster
of measurements will be useful in Judging the referent generality of his
experiment.
An example of ecological-educational
rep resentativenes s
.
one interesting example of ecological-educational
representativeness
18 ‘hat Carri6d °n by SeaVer
<S— ""I), fn this study, both positive and
negative expectancy are clearly shown in a natural setting without continued
systematic circumstances subjected to a doubtful validity. Tins author worked
With archival data on 79 pairs of siblings who had attended the same elementary
school within three years of one another. The pairs were separated according
to whether or not the siblings had had the same teacher or different teachers
in the first grade. Then the older sibling of each pair was judged "good" or
bad on the basis of first-grade IQ and achievement scores. Within this
four-fold table, achievement scores of the younger siblings served as
dependent measures. It was found on four achievement subtests that younger
siblings of good students had higher achievement scores if assigned to their
sibling's teacher than if. assigned to a different teacher. However, younger
siblings of poor students did better when given a different teacher from that of
their older siblings. In short, Seaver's study is more representative
ecologically than any of the usual educational experiments, but it is also
limited in terms of population validity and referent generality. As a correlational
105
stady, it is open to some alternative interpretations in reference to
causation. Thus, the teachers may not have been instrumental. More
observation of pupils and teachers would be necessary to define possible
mechanisms, etc. In other words, ecological variation was permitted but not
stuched in detail, nevertheless, a range of such studies presenting consistent
results would achieve a level of descriptive generality that could be highly
useful in developing a richer conceptual basis for future educational scientific
experiences.
Recapitulation
^ tMS d6ScriPtion of Brunswik’s influence on educational research it
has been suggested that: (a) systematic experiments can be made more
representative by adding improved design characteristics (see Figure 17) and
(b) that, however they neither supply an operational taxonomy nor point out
possible combinations of design characteristics. If we look carefully at
Figure 17, and combine the three dimensions of quasi-representativeness,
we discover: (1) a dimension for population representativeness running from
studies with minimal sample description through studies that analyze aptitudes
specifically selected for their relevance to treatment variables; (2) a dimension
ranging from laboratory experiments to experiments or naturalistic studies in
which ecological variation is both allowed and investigated and (3) a continuum
106Of outcome measures increasing in referent generality. These three measures
are not. of course, orthogonal in describing the basic traits of past and future
in educational research, in a logical
-t8 CE1 ^retica] order, these three
dimensions are rather different, and they
lead to an operative decision, which i
point to distinct strategies. But they
laboratory investigation as well
s to say that there is a place for artificial
as systematic experimentation in schools,
and that there is also at the present time space for quasi-representative
experiments and naturalistic-quantitative case stadies. The selection of a
particular design at a particular point must be made in accordance with the
exigency of ecological necessity.
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APPEND I x A
A SIMPLISTIC DESCRIPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCA-
TIONAL TERMS RELATED WITH BRUNSWIK'S CONCEPTUAL BODY
Achievement
The degree or level of success attained in some spe-
cific area.
Achievement motivation
An inferred specialized characteristic of the human
being that is learned early in life, causing him to stri-
ye for bigger and better accomplishements
. Achievement
is generally considered to be a significant social goal
and, as such, an incentive that pressures people to
strive for higher standards.
To measure achievement motivation, a group of Harvard
psychologists carried on research using a modified the-
matic apperception technique. Subjects were asked to
create stories about sets of pictures presented to them.
From their creations, a need achievement score was ob-
tained, measuring a probable indicator not only of the
119
SU°eSSfUl accomPlishn,ent but alsohis need either to avoid failure or toorget failure experiences
( Atkinson, 1958 ; McClellandAtkinson et alt., 1953; McClelland and Winter, 1969 ).
'
Ad aptation
Change m structure or behavior that has survival va-U6/ n°W
'
m°re generally
,
any beneficial change to
meet environmental demand. In a more reduced but rela-
ed sense, "sensory adaptation" is the maintenance of
sensory effectiveness under changing conditions of sti-
mulation. See also "adaptation level".
Ada ptation level
Adaptation level (AL) is the Hypothesized neutral
point or region of organic functionalism at which coin-
ciding stimuli are indifferent or ineffective, stimuli
above AL having a given character, and stimuli below AL
having an opposite or complementary quality. AL repre-
sents the pooled effect of three classes of factors: (a)
stimuli immediately responded to, or in the focus of
attention; (b) stimuli having background or contextual
influence; and (c) residuals from past experience with
similar stimuli. Quantitatively, AL is the logarithmic
mean of these three classes of factors weighted accor-
ding to relevant dimensions of effectiveness, e.g., si-
ze, nearness, intensity, quality, affective value, sig-
nificance, etc. (Helson, 1947, 1959 ).
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A d 2 u s t m e n t
A state in which the needs of the individual onthe one hand and the claims of the environment on the
other are fully satisfied. This state of harmony isOf course expressible only in theoretical terms, sincem practice no more than a relative adjustment is rea-
ched m the sense of optimal satisfaction of indivi-
dual needs and untroubled relation to the environment.
Adjustment takes the form of variation in the organism
through the adquisition of responses appropriate to
the situation; the variation in the organism may be
biological. See "adaptation" and "adaptation level".
A 1 b e d
Quality of being ( -edo ) white ( alb- ) ; the white
ness of a surface. The percentage or fraction of inci-
dental light or radiation reflected by a surface ( as
the moon, the ground, or snow ). An albedo of 50 per
cent of the light falling on it. Coined by German ma-
thematitian and philosopher Johan H. Lambert ( 1728-
1777 ) , who said that albedo was the refractive qua-
lity of light that was diffusely reflected by a body
( Berelyne, 1958 ) .
Analysis o f variance
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a statistical pro-
cedure that involves partitioning the total sum of
squared deviations of scores into components, each
part being associated with some experimental variable
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or with chance. In the samplest case, analysis of va-
riance involves the ratio of two sources of variation:
) e variation of scores around their sample means
an the variation of sample means around the popu-lation means. This ratio, called an F ratio, is given by
F = EH—
amnong groups
MS within groups
If the preceding two variance estimates are really es-
timates of the same population variance, the F approa-
ches 1.0. If the sample variance of means around the po-
pulation mean is greater than the score variance around
the sample means, the sample probably do not represent
random samples from the same population. In this case,
the F rhtio is greater tha 1.0. In general, analysis of
variance is used to test statistical hypothesis concer-
ning two more population means.
Ana lysis o f covariance
A statistical technique combining advantages of li-
near regression analysis with analysis of variance me-
thods. Analysis of covariance allows the dependent va-
riable to be adjusted so that the effects of the uncon-
trolled error variance can be removed from the concomi-
tant variable. Thus, it helps control nuisance variables.
Analysis of covariance, however, requires not only the
usual assumptions necessary for the analysis of varian-
ce approach but also demands progressively more invol-
ved assumptions concerning the regression effects. Addi-
tionally, it is more laborious to compute. See " ana-
lysis of variance".
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Arc
Nervous arc or circuit is the path taken by a neu-
ral impulse travelling from a receptor through one or
more connector neurons to an effector or executive or-gan.
c a s e h i s t o
A collection of all available evidence - social, psy-
chological, physiological, biographical, environmental,
vocational, etc. - that promises to help explain a sin-
gle individual or a single social unit, such as a family.
It is used particulary in psychopathology, guidance, and
social work. Since it emphasizes the single case or ins-
tance, it differs in aim from an experiment and from sta-
tistical studies. But the case study often incorporates
data from experiments or tests, and a series of case stu-
dies may be subjected to statistical study and generali-
zation.
Cluster analysis
An analysis of trait intercorrelations, based on clus-
tering those traits ( or items ) showing similar patterns
of inter- item correlations. The method is more superfi-
cial than factor analysis, for which it sometimes subs-
titutes. See"factor analysis".
Cluster sampling
A procedure for restricted random sampling that invol-
ves dividing the population into clusters and then taking
a random sample from each cluster or from different clus-
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viauais. Generally, a cluster sampling is considered
an integral part of area sampling. See "sampling tec
niques"
.
. h-
Consistency j n d e x
A means of determining the extend to which the mem
bers of a group give the same responses to the same s
mulus or task at a state time:
Where A= number of responses both times; D= number of
responses omitted or denied both times; B and C = num-
ber of responses present one time and not the other res
pectively; i= consistency indek.
The constancy hypothesis is the postulate that there
local or proximal stimulus and the sensory response or
sensation, so that the sensory response to the same sti-
mulus occurs in unaltered form, no matter what the atten-
dant circumstances. The theory is attributed by Gestalt
theorists to their opponents; in its strict form, it is
subscribed probably by none.
Constancy
is a strict parallelisme or correspondence between the
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—° n S t a n c y, perceptual
A person's tendency to perceive experience as ex-pected, as being relatively stable under diverse con-ditions of stimulation, such as in environmental varia-
bility. The tendency of perceptual responses to be re-
latively independent of environmental alterations, so
that one perceives objects as constant ( same size,
shape, color, etc. ) even though they stimulate sense
receptors differently. Perception constancy does not
operate if a reduction screen ( which eliminates con-
text cues ) is used to view an object. Because of co-
lor constancy, for example, hues tend to be correc-
ly perceived in spite of changes in illumination; be-
cause of size constancy, background or foreground ob-
jects tend to be perceived in terms of their objecti-
ve sizes. One tends to correct for illumination diffe-
rences ( brightness constancy ) , for angle of view
( shape constancy ) , or for distance ( size constan-
cy ) . Perceptual constancy, in social psychology, has
been studied in relation to expectancy of outcome.
Covariation
Covariation or correlation coefficient is the de-
gree to which two or more variables vary together. The
parallelism between variables is usually imperfect; the
i
measure of the degree of concomitance is the correla-
tion coefficient. The correlation coefficient is a
number that indicates the strength of the tendency of
two or more variables to vary concomitantly. Perfect
correspondence between the two is expressed by -1.00;
complete lack of correspondence, i.e., independence of
the two variables, is expressed by 0.00. Fractional va-
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lues of the coefficient are not to be read as per-
centages. The product moment correlation or " r "
is most frequently used, and this coefficient is
meant unless the context shows that an alternative
method of computation has been employed. See "corre-
lation"
.
C o n t r o 1
Scientific or experimental control is regulation
of conditions so that the effect of a given supposed
cause is clearly and unambiguously displayed. Inclu-
ded m this general meaning of scientific control is
the systematic variation of the experimental ( or
treatment ) variable. When control is used concretly,
however - i.e., for a particular control - it refers
to any intentional modification of conditions other
than in the experimental variable, such changes being
made to insure that the effect being measured .really
a function of the experimental variable.
From this concrete meaning of control are derived
the concepts of 'control group" and "control experiment",
series, or test. A control group consists of a num-
ber of persons who are not exposed to the experiment
variable but are exposed to as many as possible of the
other conditions in the experiment, the purpose being
to insure that the effects under examination are not the
results of differences in the persons. The control
group should be representative of the population for
which a generalization is to be made. A control expe-
riment or series or test is a repetition of a previous
process with or without a change in conditions other
than those involved previously, to determine whether
the same cause-effect relations hold. The control ex-
periment or series often includes checks on the func-
tioning of apparatus, the clarity of the instructions
and any changes in collateral conditions such as time
of day. The basic notion in control is negative; one
seeks evidence that the experimental results are not
due to irrevelant variables.
Correlation
Correlation coefficient is a statistical value that
indicates the degree of relationship between two or
more variables. Correlation coefficients vary between
-1.00 and + 1.00; 0.00 indicates the complete absen-
ce of any correlation, while the coefficients - 1.00
and + 1.00 indicate a wholly negative or positive co-
rrelation. Correlation is evidence of relationship but
does not necessarily indicate a cause-and-ef fect rela-
tion
.
The term correlation was introduced into mathema-
tics in 1708. Auguste BRAVA IS ( 1811-1863 ), French ma-
thematician, worked out theorems of correlation in 1846;
Galton used correlation concepts from 1877 and parti-
cularly in 1885 in his regression studies; Karl Pear-
son developed mathematical concepts of correlation in
1896. See "covariation".
Criterion
A standard selected as the goal to be achieved in a
task. A set of scores or some other measure .of performan-
ce against which the success of a productive test is ve-
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rifled or compared. For example, a supervisor's ra-ting of a worker's performance on the job is a cri-terion for judging the validity of an aptitude test.
The criterion variable is the variable used to testanother variable or by which another is judged.
Cue
A cue is a signal for action. That specific portion
Of a perceptual field or pattern of stimuli to which an
animal has learned to respond, it is usual to restrict
the meaning of cue to that which produces an operant
response, but it is also used to denote that which arou-
ses expectancy.
A cue is also an identifying mark that permits dis-
crimination or recognition of a stimulus pattern. The
term cue is particularly appropriated in denoting a
mark that is an obscure part of the stimulus or an acci-
dental concomitant. If the cue stimulus is very faint and
not specifically attended to, it is called a "minimal
cue"
.
C u 1 t u r e
The pattern of those arrangements, material and be-
havioral, whereby a particular society achieves for its
members greater satisfactions than they can achieve in
a state of nature. It includes social institutions and
knowledge
, belief
,
art, morals, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of
society.
Depth 128
The localization of perceivpH 4.
( oerceivrf v
ed objects in phenomenalperce ed ) space in regard to the distance between
e o lects and the individual
( egocentric depth lo-
glrHoT d
0" abSOlUtS l0CaUzati°n >. or in re-9 to the istance between the objects themselves (re-tive ). Depth perception can occur in various moda-lties, though most precisely in the visual modality
the term often means only one's awareness of the dis-tance between one and the visually perceived object)
,
It also occurs in hearing ( loudeness, frequency spec-trum ) and in some animals through use of tactile-op-
tic sensors. In man the sense of smell plays hardly anypart in depth localization. Although different senses
can be implicated, a unified impression of phenomenal
distance is obtained ( unified phenomenal or perceived
space, also active space )
D e s i
Two sorts~>of design are specifically considered here:
experimental design and representative design.
Experimental design is the testing of hypothesis in
regard to the dependence and interdependence of varia-
bles. In a "design" of this kind, it is possible to plot
the effects of one or more independent variables on one
or more dependent variables. In general, experimental
design refers to measures adopted to ensure that the
planning and procedure of an experiment use all availa-
ble appropriate information and as far as possible take
into account all implicated factors. In this sense, ex-
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per imental design includes selection of beha-
vior to be observed
,
precise formulation of the
hypothesis to be tested ( choice of the appropria-
te statistical procedure before carrying out the
experiment ) , and determination of the sample si-
ze and control variables in accordance with the
precision of the statistical test chosen.
Representative design seeks to give effect to
all relevant variables in such way as to represent
their frecuency of occurrence and range of varia-
tion. It combines experimental with statistical
manipulation of variables. See "ecological validi-
ty".
Dif ferential psychology
Differential psychology is concerned with the
nature and origin of individual differences in psy-
chological traits. Such differences are not limi-
ted to man, but occur throught the range of the
animal kingdom. Psychological studies of animals,
from one-celled organisms to anthropoid apes, re-
veal wide individual differences in learning, emo-
tionality, motivation, and other behavioral charac-
teristics. So great is the range of these charac-
teristics and differences within individual species
that the ranges of performance often overlap even
when widely separated species are compared. When
submitted to the same learning task, the brightest
rat in a group may excel the dullest monkey.
Although in the popular mind persons are often
thought of as belonging to distinct categories,
C dull vs. bright, excitable vs. calm ), actual mea
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surement of any psychological trait shows that indivi-duals vary m degree along a continous scale. In most
traits, the distribution approximates the bell-shaped
normal probability curve, with the greatest clustering
of cases near the center of the range and a gradual de-
crease in numbers as the extremes are approached. First
derived by mathematicians in their study of probabili-
ty, the normal curve is obtained whenever the variable
being measured results from a very large number of in-
dependent and equally weighted factors. Because of the
extremely large number of hereditary and environmental
factors that contribute to
-he development of most psy-
chological traits, it is reasonable to expect that such
traits should be distributed in accordance with the nor
mal curve ( Tyler, 1965 )
.
Distal
The distal and proximal variables are those that in
the total chain of events constitute an act or behavior;
those located at the boundary between a body and its
surroundings are called proximal, those more remote from
that boundary are called distal.
A proximal stimulus acts directly on the receptor-
e.g., the light wave at the surface of the eye ball or
as it impinges at the retina. A distal stimulus is any
event in the environment causally related to the proxi-
mal stimulus - e.g., the energy of light at the source
or at a reflecting surface ( the latter being less dis-
tal than the former ) . The distance of an object, as dis-
tance, is also a distal stimulus. A proximal response is
the actual movement of muscles; a distal response s the
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part of the executive aspect of an act that is mea-
sured by its effect in altering the environment-orga-
nism relation. The movement of writing constitute aproximal response, the words written are the distal
response stepping movements are proximal, arrival atthe far side of the street is distal.
The proximal is correlated with the distal ( whe-
ther stimuli or response are in question ) but does
not stand in one-to-one relation with it. This fact is
the basis for what Brunswik calls representative de-
sign. See "design'', "distance" and "response".
Distance
Distance is first of all the linear distance bet-
ween two psychological data represented in the same
spatial schema. Distance is also the degree of diffi-
culty one person experiences in psychological rela-
tionships with another. The difficulty may be due to
a sense of difference in manners, ideology, personali-
ty, or status; or to an awareness of inapprochabili-
ty or unfriendliness. Psychic distance in this sense
is topologically described as a function of accessi-
bility to one personality of the several regions of
another personality, or of the amount of communica-
tion possible between their respective central regions.
Eclecticism
In theoretical system building, eclecticism is the
selection and orderly combination of compatible fea-
tures from diverse sources, sometimes from otherwise
• 132incompatible theories and systems; the effort to findvalid elements in all doctrines or theories and to com-ine them into a harmonious whole. The resulting sys-
“ is open to constant revision even in its major out-mes. A general temper of mind seems to determine the
egree to which a systematizer searches for the maxi-
m in rational order and over all consistency ( with
resulting temporary loss in exclusiveness and explana-
tory power ) , or for the maximum in understanding of
particular issues ( with some loss in the tightness of
organization). For the later approach, eclecticism is
an established term; for the former there is currently
no good name, but "formalism"perhaps describes its chief
attribute. Formalism leads to the advocacy of competing
schools and theories; eclecticism, though often called
a school, is essentially the denial of schools. Eclec-
ticism is to be distinguished from unsystematic and un-
critical combination, for which the term is "syncretism”
.
The eclectic seeks as much consistency and order as is
currently possible; but he is unwilling to sacrifice
conceptualizations that put meaning into a wide range
of facts for the sake of what he is apt to think of as a
premature and unworkable overall systematization. The
formalist thus finds the eclectic's position too loose
and uncritical. For his part the eclectic finds forma-
lism and the schools too dogmatic and rigid, too incli-
ned to reject, if not facts, at least helpful conceptua-
lizations of fact. Few psychologists, however, occu-
py a fixed position on the continuum that runs from
eclecticism to formalism. See "theory".
Ecology
Study of all interrrelated factors pertaining to
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the environment or habitat. Originally only of biologi _cal significance the concept has become of increasing
psychological importance in the study of animal psycho-logy and ethology. The German equivalent of the word
was coined by Ernst Henrich HAECKEL ( 1834-1919
) , theGerman biologist, in his work"Naturaliche Schopfulgsges-lichte ( 1868 )
.
Ecological psychology refers to the area of psycholo-
gy concerned with the study of its relationships to the
environment. Ecological psychology embraces the molar
behavior of man in relationship to all possible factors
that might affect him. Barker considers the basic pro-
blem of ecological psychology to be the manner in which
psychology copes with "non-psychological inputs". The eco-
logical environment is the natural, objective real-life
setting within which each living organism behaves.
Whereas a person's life space determines his momentary
behavior, the ecological environment provides the situa-
tional context necessary for him to behave meaningfully
as a total human being. According to Barker and his beha-
vior setting theory, " the environment is a set of homeo-
staitically governed eco-behavioral entitie consisting of
nonhuman components, human components, and control cir-
cuits that modify the componenents in predictable ways to
maintain the environmental entities in their characte-
ristic states" ( Barker, 1968, p. 186 ).
Lewin as early as 1936 suggested that the real environ-
mental situation and the individual's experience of his
own environment might be studied under what he called
psychological ecology". But he made no further reference
to this relationship in his field theory. See "environment"
and "molar".
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in reference to learning and teaching pro
One of the important tasks of educational psycholo-
gy is the investigation and theoretical elucidation of
learning processes. Today the significance of the bio-
logical and constitutional bases of learning processes
is generally accepted ( Burt, 1949; Newman, Freeman and
Holzinger
, 1937 ). The elucidation of the individual sta
te of development, of personal capacity at a particular
moment of time, plays an important part in the investi-
gation of human learning processes ( McGeoch and Irion,
1952; Gagne, 1967 ). Stimuli for novel research work are
offered in the postulates of Gagne ( 1967 ) , who holds
that human learning-insofar as it can be independent of
variable conditions - occurs in various forms, whose in-
teraction can be expressed by a hierarchical ratio of in
terdependence
. An emphasis on the human aspects of lear-
ning processes is accompanied in more recent educational
research by an emphasis on their social context ( Back-
man and Secord, 1968 ). In addition to the analysis of
learning processes, research into the conditions for and
functions of teaching is a primary area of educational
psychology. In this regard, researchers are concerned
both with general instructional methodology ( Bloom,
1956, 1964 ) and the analysis of styles of teaching and
the roles of educators ( Aebli, 1961; Hermann, 1966 ) . In
vestigations of the effects of specific dimensions of
teacher behavior ( Tausch and Tausch, 1965 ), or of the
interaction of teaching style and learning performance
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amples of a current direction of research inthrs area. The effects of education on motivation
Heckhausen, 1966 ), the optimal arousal of inte-
rest by specific teacher strategies, the extensiveteld of curriculum studies ( Achtenhagen and Meyer,1971; Bruner, I960, 1966 ) and instructional techno-logy ( Skinner, 1968 ) are also important areas ofinvestigation
.
E ropirica 1
At least six distinct meanings can be assigned
to the term empirical: (1) in relation to facts or
experience; (2) in evaluating facts and disparaging
or subordinating theory or speculation; (3) in pro-
ceeding without guidance from theory; trial and error
investigation
( this is never possible in an absolute
sense ); (4) as a generalization not based on, nor
as yet related to, a superior generalization or theo-
ry; (5) in reference to experiemntal knowledge; (6) ha-
ving a basis in factual investigation. The term is
sometimes one of price ( avoiding "empty" speculation
or mere theorizing ) ; sometimes one of disparagement
( lacking necessary rationality or theory, unsyste-
matically gathering facts ) .Usage (5) seems to intro-
duce unnecessary duplication. Usage (6) in refering
to exper indentation and all other systematic collec-
tion of data, is the one most useful to modern psycho- v>
logy. The meaning of the term empirical contrasts
with, but it is not necessarely opposed to, the
terms a priori, rational, or deductive.
Empirical law
A law based on data ( i.e., on facts or observa-
136ions ) and expressing in general form the invariantre ationships between two or more sets of data (i etwo or more variables ). it contrasts with the con-"cepts of rational law, deductive law, and a priorilaw, each of which designates a general statement ofrelations that dnpt; nri-i- ^4- i
on data !
St
' rtmediately
, rests
or observations.
IL™ Pi ricism and
e mpirici s m
scientif i c
The philosophical view that experience is the on-ly source of knowledge and that science must deal ex-
clusively with objectively observable facts. Behavio-
rism is in this sense a form of empiricism. Some em-
piricists hoewever accept the view that "observable
fact in any science is a matter of experience ( the
observed fact taht an object has a certain density
is provided by experience ) . But the experience that
then constitutes the fact of science is, thus, only
the experience of the observing scientist ( not subjec-
tive experience ) stated in physicalist terms. See
physicalism"
.
Empiricism can also be understood as a science or
an art based as little as possible on deduction from
general principles and guided almost entirely by in-
ductive generalizations, usually by generalizations
having narrow range and not rationally related to
each other.
Scientific empiricism is somewaht diffuse philo-
sophic movement that seeks to establish a science of
sciences. It holds that the instrument of all scien-
ces is the experience of the scientist himself used
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as a means of examining the several coherent bodies
facts that constitute the various sciences. Sta-
tements about experience must be operationally de-
fined. The movement calls for studies of the lan-
guage of sciences and the principles governing the
building of theory around empirical facts. As U
applied in psychology, the term implies that menta-
listic concepts may be used if introduced by opera-
tional definitions anchored to changes along a phy-
sical or physicalist continuum.
Environment
The sum of external conditions and factors poten-
tially capable of influencing an organism. Not the
same as the sum of stimuli, since some of these are
internal; and some parts of the environment ( i.e.,
ultraviolet rays ) influence the organism without
being stimuli. "Milieu" is properly the organism
and its immediate environment, but is often used to
refer to the latter alone. See "stimulus", "ecology"
Environmental psychology
The study of behavior in relationship to its en-
vironmental influences ( considering constraints on
ranges of behavior as well as freedom to operate )
,
involving such specifics as climatic extremes, crow-
ding, etc., and their effects on setting patterns
of behavior ( e.g., the behavioral patterns of a
salesman in Buenos Aires, Chicago or Los Angeles).
Environmental psychology also studies why persons
move toward or away from some aspect of a geographi-
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cal or environmental location ( the approach-avoidan-
ce conflict of persons attempting to decide whether
or not to live in the sun-smog environment of Tokyo)
.
Considered synonymous with ecological psychology (
Whohwill, 1970 ) .
Event
A part of reality that changes within space and
time limits. The limits may be greater or small accor
ding to context: for geologist a centur ies-long emer-
gence of a mountain chain may be a single event. But
a definite beginning and end, both in time and spa-
ce, are necessary; and to be one event the processes,
activities, or happenings must be somehow related. A
phenomenon is relatively stable and generally less
extensive grouping of data, so that several phenome-
na may be said to compose one event. However the two
terms are often interchangeable. Event is also a fun-
damental concept in probability theory. Each possible
outcome of an experiment is called an elementary or
simple event, an element that is completely abstract.
Compound events are constructed from simple events,
the outcome of several elements of an experiment.
Experiment
An experiment is the planned manipulation of va-
riables for observation purposes? at least one of
the variables, i.e., the independent or experimen-
tal variable, is altered under predetermined condi-
, . 1'JCJions during the experiment; any other variable whose
alteration is observed as a function of this changeis known as the dependent variable. If an alteration ofthe dependent variable appears possible, the other va-
riabl.es needed in the experiment are either held cons-tant for the duration of observation ( controlled varia-bles, experimental parameters ) or disregarded as irre-
velant variables. Every controlled variable is there-
fore a possible independent variable 1 for further expe-
riments. The observation must allow a clear identifica-
tion of the changes in the dependent variables within
the limits of accuracy needed for a particular experi-
ment; the observation therefore requires a measurement
at least on a nominal level.
Experimental methods contrast with empirical methods
( differential methods ) , in which a special set of va-
riables is sought for observational ( measurement ) pur-
poses. Since none of the variables can be manipulated
m a predetermined manner during the observation, the
distinction between dependent and independent variables
ceases to apply; no direct conclusions can therefore
be drawn from the results on the direction of the de-
pendence. The definition of the experiment includes con
sideration of its purpose. An arrangement used experi-
mentally to determine the direction and nature of rela-
tions between variables can also be used for measure-
ment - i.e., for other experiments - as soon as these
relations are known. Experimental methods are therefore
frequently used as empirical methods ( tests )
.
The types of experiments are ordered as follows:
rxable is altered and the effect measured on one ormore dependent variables; (2, multivariate experiments
c
“ S6Veral ^pendent variables are altered in
'
ombination in such a way that the effects of each va-ble can be determined separately and their interac-lon examined. Techniques are described in the litera-ture of experimental testing and evaluation
, genera-lly by analysis of variance ) . Further classification
of experiments can be derived from the degree of gra-duation of the independent variables. In bivalent ex-
periments, the independent variable assumes only two
values ( e.g., dependence of calculability on the occu-
rrence or non-occurrence of an interfering noise ) . Al-
though such experiments have only limited value, they
are still frequent and sometimes inevitable. They may
show whether an effect of the experimental variables canbe proved such a demonstration will not be reliable if
there is a non-linear or non-monotonous relationship bet-
ween the independent and dependent variable: an avara-
ge noise intensity may facilitate performance while per-
formance remains unchanged at higher and lower intensi-
ties. Multivalent experiments provide the answer in this
case. In the most favorable assumption, nonmonotonous
relationships of dependent variables can beforehand be
determined using three independent variables. If even
more independent variables are used in the functional ex-
periment, it is possible to show the functional rela-
tionship with the dependent variable. The corresponding
enlargement can also be made in the multivariate experi-
ment: if the functional dependence of a variable on seve-
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ral independent variables is determined
we call it a parametric experiment. See
variance"
, "multivariate analysis".
in this way,
"analysis of
lector analysis
One or several mathematical-statistical procedu-
res involving the intercorrelation of a large num-
ber of sets or matrices of numbers. Factor analysis
starts with the location of a model that agrees with
the data and when such a model is found, estimating
its parameters. Factor analysis is aimed at discove-
ring, isolating, and analyzing the minimal number of
common factors ( determinators ) that can account for
the observed correlation ( communality ) among a set
of variables ( items of a test, etc. ). Factor analy-
sis shows in summary form the selective importance of
each factor as it is sorted out of a more complex po-
pulation, the factors being preferably fewer in num-
ber than the original variables.
There are definite advantages using factor analy-
sis in experiments, such as allowing efficient use and
evaluation of all subjects and resources as well as of
experimental and interaction effects. Disadvantages
lie in the demand for a number of probabilistic sub- 1
jects requiring different treatments
. in the large num-
ber of experiemnts required and in the complex in-
terpretations needed as interaction evolves.
F u n c t i o n a 1 i s m
A movement in psychology who^e adherents are prima-
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rily interested in finding the answers to the "how"
and why of psychological phenomena. Originating
about 1896, it was sparked by James Rowland Angell
and John Dewey of the University of Chicago, after
William James and others had gathered the fuel. Func-
tionalism was a revolt against the structuralism of
Titchner and Wundt, who studied mental processes as
activities leading to practical results. It utili-
zed common sense as part of its field. It was con-
cerned with the active, adaptative, and functional
processes of mental life ( conscious experience )
,
not solely the conscious "structures", such as thougts,
feelings, and sensations. Functionalism, therefore,
led naturally into applied psychology, primarily edu-
cational psychology.
The term presents confusion, however, when consi-
dered internationally. The schools called "structu-
ral" in Europe correspond to those called "functional"
in the United States. In Germany, for instance, "func-
tional psychology" and "act psychology" are practica-
lly synonymous, with"mental acts" producing "content".
German structural psychologists have attacked the ve-
ry concepts that United States " structural psycholo-
gists" have defended.
Gestalt
A group of related psychological ideas, developed
about 1910-1912 by the German psychologists Werthei-
mer, Kohler and Koffka, emphasizing holistic concepts,
or the unity of an individual or group rather than
lysis of its parts or elements. The properties of a
ana-
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gestalt are properties of the whole as such, and are
not derived from the summation of its parts. Converse-ly, the parts derive their properties from their mem-bership in the whole. The notion of •parts" with attri-butes of their own, independent of the whole is held tobe misleading. The standard illustration is that of a
melody, which has qualities as a melody that are not
merely the sum of the component tones, but that result
from the playing of many instruments at different pit-
ches so that the constituent tones are totally diffe-
rent, yet the melody remains the same. Conversely, a gi-
ven tone, say B flat, has different psychological ( and
musical ) characteristics in different melodic settings-
i.e., its qualities as a part of a whole depend on that
whole. This is not to deny that B flat, heard in isola-
tion, is a whole or gestalt in its own right. But such
a B flat is not psychologically the same B flat that is
heard in a melody.
As applied to behavior, Gestalt theory denies that
response to a situation can be stated in terms of a com-
bination of separate responses to a combination of se-
parate stimuli; it is a whole response to the whole si-
tuation, with specific components serving as salient fi-
gures rather than as distinct elements. Learning is said
to proceed, not by accretion, but by reorganization.
Isolation o f v a r i a b 1 e s
In an experiment, intentional alteration of a con-
dition ( independent variation ) , in order to observe
a dependent variable, while all other conditions are
kept constant, or are not altered systematically. The
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effect of individual conditions which are otherwiseclosely bound up with the phenomenon or process can
en e observed by isolation. See "variable".
L o n g j t u d i n a 1 stu d i e s
Studies concerned with the changes occurring in indi
vrduals over extended periods of time, or studies in
w ich samples of a population are selected and then stuled intensively as age and experience increase.
Matching
An experimental method of control by which subjects
under different conditions are rendered similar on the
basis of some variable other than the independent va-
riable.
a t r 1 ^ correlation
A table showing the correlation coefficient of eve-
ry variable with every other variable in a set. The ma-
trix displays each variable at the head of a row and a
column; hence, each coefficient occurs once in that por-
tion of the table located above the diagonal running
from upper-left to lower right, and once below that
diagonal
.
Means object
Any object, the response to which brings an organism
closer to its goal. It may be merely a cue to the proper
course of action - e.g., the activity of entering a co-
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rrect alley in a maze brings into view some cue indi-
cating that the goal is being approached. The means
object can be thought of as a subordinate goal but,
unlike the goal ( or goal object ) , it does not bring
the action to a conclusion. The means object instiga-
tes an expectancy.
Measurement
In contrast to the classical natural sciences, psycho-
logy does not have at its disposal a uniform system of
measurement. At the present day, the various aspects of
behavior that are of psychological interest appear to be
so incommensurable that very few, if any, attempts are now
made to apply a uniform method of measurement to the in-
dividual psychological disciplines. That is why, in the
course of the history of psychology, different methods
of measurement have evolved for different areas or fields
of psychology. Thus, in psychophysics for example, sca-
ling methods are chiefly used; in neuropsychology, me-
thods of measurement deriving from physiology ( chemes-
try and physics, etc. ) ; and finally, in experimental
psychology and psychodiagnostics, very diverse methods
of measurement, which are described under the appropria-
ted terms.
Measurement theory indicates the conditions ( assump-
tions, peripheral conditions ) under which an empirical
relative value can be converted into significant numeri-
cal relative value with the help of specific models (mea-
surement models ) . Psychologists have always devoted con-
siderable interest to measurement theory because of the
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problems that arise in recording psychological variakies
. See "variable".
Mediator
The system that intervens between receiver and the
transmitter, it combines the function of destination
and source. An organism, in its function of receiving
and transmitting information is a mediator.
The mediation theory asserts that certain stimuli
( usually called signs in this theory ) do not directly
initiate instrumental behavior but activate an inter-
vmmg process that is connected in a complex syste-
matic way with many action systems. The mediation theo-
ry is described in S - R terms.
Mentalism
The doctrine that there is a distinct group of cons-
cious or mental phenomena not reducible without refe-
rence to physical phenomena. Traditionally all mental
phenomena were supposed to be conscious; but many autho-
rities recognize as distinctly mental ( i.e., distin-
guishable from purely physical processes ) a class of
phenomena that are not conscious.
Method
In the broad sense, a systematic way of dealing
with facts and concepts. It includes four different
kinds of operations: (1) rational principle, the form
of reasoning utilized, e.g., hypothetico-deductive
principle, inductive principle ( both often called me-
thods ); (2 )point of view, a way of looking at the
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data, or the intention assumed in an investigation,
e.g., the nomothetic point of view, the mechanistic
point of view; (3) procedure, a specific type of ope
ration or order of attack in a investigation, a brin
ging into relationship of the variables that bear on
the problem at hand, e.g., the procedure of the li-
mits ( more often called the method of limits ) , the
nondirective ( or client-centered
) procedure.
Model
A logical, mathematical, or mechanical miniature
system that parallels some larger or more complex sys-
tem. Models are used in simulation studies for pre-
dicting, and for comparing one system with another
( such as comparing an electronic brain with the brain
itself ) . It also can be described as a set of data in
terms of a system of symbols, and the manipulation of
symbols according to the rules of that system. The re-
sulting transformations are translated back into the
language of the data, and the relationships discovered
through the manipulations are compared with the empi-
rical facts.
Psychology has borrowed the "model" concept to help
to define, delimit, and express various problems in a
more convenient and structural manner. Operations for
an abstract model ( e.g., an attitude change ) are
programmed as if for a computer. When certain infor-
mational bits are relayed to the human psychological ma-
chine, for example, only certain specific and predic-
table attitudes changes can result. Some classes of mo-
Cie :
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dels are: the algoristic, descriptive, or determi-
nistic type ( involving certainty in outcome ) , sto-
chastic or probabilistic ( involving uncertainty in
outcome ) ; predictive or relative ( for purposes of
evaluating potential results ) ; normative models or
gaming models ( for decision making and development
of strategies in which tentative guide lines can be
devised and studied, such as in executive games with
management and labor unions with various matrices des-
cribing the game and subsequent pay off ) ; linear pro-
graaing models ( often used in operations research
procedures for determining ratios and relative effi-
ciency of one solution over another ) ; congruity mo-
dels, etc. Stimulus-sampling is a special example of
the use of stochastic model, using a combination of set
theory and probability theory ( Walker, 1968 )
Molar - m o 1 e c u 1 a r
There are five possible definitions of molar that
in fact refer to the same data. One: molar behavior
is a large unit segment of a total behavior stream
that possesses essential unity. Two: a unit of the beha-
vior stream whose unity and distinctiveness derive
from the end it serves or the effects it produces in
the external world. It is not implied that all beha-
vior leading to the same goal belong in the same unit;
the molar unit is a unit of actually occurring beha-
vior, not a class. Thus, the varied ways a person be-
haves in getting to his office - by motoring, wal-
king, etc. are equivalent, but the molar unit consists
in the particular way in which he actually did get
there. Three: a behavior unit considered an emergent
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phenomenon, having qualities not stable as a sum
of parts. Four: any behavior that shows docility,
i.e., that has been learned and may be further mo-
dified by learning. Five: behavior described in non-
physical
, psychological constructs.
Molar behavior is contrasted with molecular be-
havior, which refers to a small unit, generally defi-
ned in terms of specific movements elicited by spe-
cific stimuli, or in physiological terms. As the oppo-
site of an emergent phenomenon, molecular means the
behavior unit reached by deductive analysis. This is
the method of investigation that holds that analyzed
parts are real and that the whole can be completely
explained in terms only of the analyzed parts. It
is thus the opposite of emergentism and Gestalt, which
hold that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
The reductionism of structural psychology attempted
to reduce all psychological phenomena to the most ele-
mentary psychological processes. Contemporary reduc-
tionism generally seeks to phrase psychological pro-
blems in stimulus-response terms and to reduce these
further to psychological or even psychochemical terms.
See "Gestalt", "reductionism".
Multivariate analysis
The statistical analysis of data consisting of
n - triples ( pairs, triples, etc. ) of observations,
that is, the simultaneous analysis of data for two
or more dependent variables. A multivariate distribu-
tion consists of data in which more than two measu-
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rements are taken for each individual.
Multivariate sampling-distribution theory had its
origin in an article published in 1928 by U. Wishart
See "experiment"
, "variable".
—
-
a tura l sciences
Natural sciences are those dealing with natural
objects
,
generally taken to include physics, chemis-
try, and biology and to exclude mathematics, philo-
sophy, and the social sciences. The question whether
psychology is a natuarl science is essentially ter-
minological. Because of its uncertain boundaries, the
term is of doubtful value.
Nomothetic
- ideographic
Relating to the search for and the establishing
of general laws to explain behavior. An approach to
personality study emphasizing the collection measu-
rement of statistics to describe general principles
concerning individual differences. Used by educators
in studying, for example, large groups of "underachie
vers", by sociologists in their statistical emphasis
upon studying people, and by psychologists ( such as
McClelland ) in developing concepts designed to pre-
dict the average score.
The ideographic approach is related to the study
of uniqueness in the individual. A psychological view
point in which the unique individual is the only pro-
per and final unit of analysis. The clinical psycho-
logists, psychitrist, social worker, and others using
151
. case stud, method, employ the ideographic approach
.n German philosopher Wilhem Wlndelband coinedthe terms ideographic and nomothetic in his book "Anintroduction to Philosophy". He proposed that ideogra-
rc a to be used to gain an appreciation of thesmgle event of a scientific or natural law. ideogra-phic psychology, for example, is the art of under-
stand people in their uniqueness.
Initially, Allport ( 1937 ) considered this method
the most productive and reasonable one to use for de-
veloping tru concepts and laws concerning behavior In
1962, however, he selected the term "morphogenetic"
to replace ideographic, since it did not bear the stig-
ma of being so extreme and restrictive in its focus
on uniqueness ( Allport, 1937, I 960 ).
Q b j e c t constancy
An object is always recognized as the same even when
the stimulus context or spatial interval changes. Of-
ten an object can still be identified even when it is
only visible in part. This constancy of an object de-
pends on the constancy with which definite qualities
are perceived, e.g., shape, size or color. To explain
this constancy one may refer to the gestalt principle
by which perceived objects stand out from their su-
rroundings as complete shapes. When such shape has once
entered the memory, it is recognized when seen again,
whatever its background.
Qperatio n a 1 i s m
The doctrine by which terms, propositions, concepts,
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nd the°rxes derive all their meaning - in the lastanalysis
- through the methods of observation or in-
vestigation used to arrive at them; in other wordshey have no other meaning than that yielded up by
e procedures or operations by which the things orprocesses to which they refer are known. Thus a gi-
ven mental age means merely that under certain stan-dard conditions the child can perform such tasks as
counting backward, fitting blocks into appropriate
slots, or reproducing a design from memory. A thres-
hold means only that the individual has made certainjudgments when certain prescribed psychological pro-
cedures have been followed. It follows that a thres-
hold obtained by one psychological procedure does not
have the same meaning as one obtained by another pro-
cedure, unless the equivalence is proved by other:,pre
cedures. In the same way, classical and instrumental
conditioning, being defined by distinct operations, ,
must be considered distinct concepts until linked ( a
some think they have been by common operations. On
the other hand, many terms that are given apparently
different verbal definitions turn out to have refe-
rence to the same operations, in which case is only
one concept.
Operationalism is related to but distinguishable
from physicalism and from positivism.
According to the doctrine of operationalism, the
whole meaning of any term rests ultimately upon facts
gained through direct observation but it may be seve-
ral degrees removed from the observation. The meaning
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of I.Q. is derived by dividing mental age by chro-
nical age
, neither of which is an observed fact
but extends back to direct observations. Sometimes
however
,
the linkage with empirical fact is missing
and the definition lacks meaningful reference.
When we do have operational definition, it does
not guarantee the actual existence of the object or
©vent named, but only that it has meaning.
Organism
A living being capable of maintaining itself as a
system and composed of parts capable of performing
certain coordinated functions. Thus organism is de-
fined as that which performs the functions of an or-
ganism. No agreement on what constitutes organismic
function has been reached. It is customary, however,
to define organism by pointing to physiological func
tions only. However this either concept is an arbi-
trary one, or it represents the imposition of a me-
taphysical bias in the mere act of defining. An orga
nism should be defined in terms of all functions it
is empirically observed to perform, including those
which, in our present state of knowledge, are called
psychological. The organism should, therefore, be
conceived as psychophysiological
,
in other words as
a system that performs both psychological and physio
logical functions.
Organismic
Organismic is used by positivistic and behavio-
ristic writers to point up an opposition to menta-
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listio notions, but also by some extreme anti-
behaviorists ( chiefly educationists ) to empha-
size a holistic attitude. Thus a certain kind of
emotional ferVor ( on both sides ) has resulted
in strange terminological bedfellows. But the de-
nomination of the term is quite clear: it just
means pertaining to an organism.
O rthogonal
Relating to ( - al ) two mutually independent
comparisons in which the products of their corres-
ponding coefficients result in zero, since they
intersect at straight ( ortho - ) angles ( - gon - ) .
A solution in which the axes representing facr-
tors are at the right angles to each other. Such
factors are uncorrelated or independent. Orthogonal
is contrary to an obligue ( axes ) solution in which
the factors are correlated.
Perceptual constancy
A personas tendency to perceive experience as ex-
pected, as being relatively stable under diverse
conditions of stimulation, such as environmental va-
riability. The tendency of perceptual responses to
be relatively independent of environmental altera-
tions, so that one perceives objects as constant (sa-
me size, shape, color, etc. ) even though they sti-
mulate sense receptors differently.’ Perception cons-
tancy does not operate if a reeducation screen (which
155
eliminates context cues ) is used to view an objectBecause of color constancy for example, hues tend toe correctly perceived in spite of changes in illumi-
because of size constancy, background of fore-ground objects tend to be perceived in terms of their
objective sizes. One tends to correct for illumina-
tion differences ( brightness constancy ), for angle
of view ( shape constancy ), or for distance ( size
onstancy ). Perceptual constancy, in social psycholo-
gy, has been studied in relation to expectancy of out-
come. See "object constancy".
£_ a r t i a 1 reinforcement
An experimental condition in which subjects recei-
ve reinforcement not after every response but for on-
ly a portion of occurrences ( at various time inter-
vals or after a certain number of responses)
. It is
the type of reinforcement most often found in nature.
Different schedules of partial reinforcement may lead
to different response rates; for example, rats on a
fixed time schedule may make few responses, while tho-
se reinforced after a certain number of responses may
respond often and rapidly ( Lewis, 1950 ).
Physicalism
A term advanced by Carnap in 1931 and adopted by
the Vienna Circle. It designates a thesis according
to which all the sciences, and specially the human
sciences, can and should be expressed in the langua-
ge of the physical sciences, in order to unify the
sciences by means of a universal language that is
homogeneous and free from any metaphysical implica-
tion, and that includes only empirically manipulable
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propositions, i.e. those which designate observa-
ble properties of things. After having explained
the rules of formation and transformation so that
any proposition in the various sciences can be ex-
pressed by means of them, it is possible ( by trans-
forming the qualitative into the quantitative ) to
reduce the total number of disciplines to a small
number of deductive systems, and, ultimately to one
such system. In Carnap^s words " the application of
physicalism to psychology is the logical basis for
the method of behaviorism" ( Morris, 1937; Jorgen-
sen, 1951 )
.
Physiognomy
The human face as a vehicle of expression when at
rest ( free from mimicry ) . The nature of expression
is determined by the body^s structure and the imprint
left by the traces of habitual mimic innervation. Phy-
siognomic research ( physiognomic as the theory of
facial expression ) makes use of photographs, sket-
ches ( Brunswik ), average likenesses, and learning
experiments. Results so far have shown that the va-
lidity of judgments based on the impression given by
the physiognomy is slight ( coefficient between 0.00
and 0.50 ); nevertheless, certain systematic tenden-
cies dependent on various factors appear in the jud-
gments .
Posit
To assume or to take for granted what is necessa-
ry for the immediate action or argument. Posit was
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formerly used for hypothesize by those who hesita-
ted to use that verb ( which has only recently been
accepted as standard English ) . But the two have
somewhat different meanings that may now be kept
distinct
.
Praegnanz
A law in Gestalt psychology relating to percep-
tual organization that tends toward achieving equi-
librium and balance in the simplest manner possible.
For example
,
a symbol has Praegnanz when its meaning-
fulness is comprehended as a part of the total fa-
bric; it is never an isolated concept.
P r e d i c t i o n
Psychological prediction, strictly speaking, means
forecasting the probability of future courses of ac-
tion on the basis of present and past behavior . This
behavior is influenced by environmental, innate and
personality factors and can be consciously or uncons-
ciously motivated. In a broader sense, individual pre-
has its place in all fields of psychology
and involves not only the personality at its best but
the shape it will take in the future. A distinction
is drawn between clinical, typological and statisti-
cal prediction according to the method adopted. Sta-
tistical individual prediction makes use of predic-
tion tables that have been compiled on the basis of
a fairly wide range of experience. These tables are
simply aids in the hands of an experienced psycholo-
gist when he is objectifying prediction decissions.
They must not be applied mechanically or automatica-
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Uy. Clinical individual prediction does not cons-
ously use any statistical prediction, tables. How-ever as a preparation for deciding on some predic-tion it carefully studies the life history and thefamily circumstances of the individual, makes a pur-poseful exploration and applies psychodiagnostic
tests methods. Improper forms of clinical prediction
are based upon the intuition, speculation, and subjec-lvism
( prejudice ) of the researcher; they cannot
provide a sufficient foundation for psychological de-
cision. Either the statistical or the clinical method
may be used for the individual prediction ( this may
consist of a typological application of factorial groups
taken from statistics ) , or may be made on the basis
of clinical experience ( Mehl, 1954 ).
Probabilism
The doctrine that is possible with some degree of
probability to predict certain sequences of events
on the basis of past experiences and by means of logi-
cal operations. Probabilism is the general statement
of a principle of which determinism is a highly spe-
cial case. The latter is the belief in perfect predi-
cability when all relevant facts are known, the for-
mer a belief in the possibility of degrees of predic-
tability depending on the degree of relevant informa-
tion. Probabilistic hypotheses are the postulates that
correctness of perceiving does not mean that action in
accord with the perception will be adaptative, but on-
lyly that it will probably be so. In the long run, a
correct ( or veridical ) percept can be relied on. In
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general, e.g, what looks straight can be safely be
as straight, and vice versa. Not so the illusory orincorrect. The straight stick in the water producing
the bean stick illusion cannot safely be reacted to
it appears. Illusion is the exception to a statis-
tical probability.
Pro p o s i t i o n
A verbal or equivalent symbolic statement put forth
as true
,
or as something to be tested for truth. For-
mal propositions are statements without reference to
observable events; their truth consists in being rela-
ted according to laws of logic to a system of rules. For
example, the truth of a theorem in geometry is based
simply on the correct manipulation of the symbols accor
ding to the principles of geometry ( or of a particu-
lar geometry ) . Empirical propositions are arrays of
symbols corresponding to observable events.
Psychophysics
The study of psychology in terms of the relation bet-
ween a physical stimulus and its perception by the sub-
ject. Although initiated by a physiologist ( Weber ) in
his noticeable-difference observations, psychophysics
was absorbed by psychology, indirectly leading to the
first psychological laboratory in 1879 and subsequent-
ly to experimental psychology. Fechner considered psy-
chophysics to be the science of body-mind relationships.
Today, however, it is primarily an experimental field
of investigation concerned with specifying the relations
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between stimulus-dimension and response variations
of the subject
. Its special methods are used in stu-dying controlled sensory processes. Historically,
psychophysics translates physical characteristics of
stimuli into corresponding psychological characte-
ristics ( intelligence
, attitude, etc. )
Pur P o s i v e
Tolman's purposive behaviorism is a behavioristic
Gestalt approach oriented toward the study of purpo-
se in all behavior. Tolman's purposivism eschewed in-
trospection and all subjective data, placing them out-
side the realm of science, since such phenomena could
not be judged objectively. He stressed a molar approach
to behavior, that is, he felt that purposive behavior
must be seen as a whole and not as separate ( molecu-
lar ) responses. Only overt behavior is important, and
it must be objectively observed and operationaly defi-
ned. Between stimulus and response he hypothesized in-
tervening variables ( such as cognition and demand )
,
not necessarily physiological but probably necessary
to the production of goal-directed behavior.
R e d u c t i o n i s m
A general point of view that holds that complex phe-
nomena are to be understood and explained by analyti-
cally reducing them to ever simpler, and ultimately to
strictly elementary, components. Analysis, even reduc-
tive analysis is a method of investigation employed by
everyone. Reductionism is a point of view regarding the
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results of analysis: it holds that analyzed parts
are real and that the whole can be completely ex-
plained as consisting only of the analyzed parts.
It is thus the opposite of emergentism and Gestalt,
which hold that the whole is more than the sum of
its parts. The reductionism of structural psycholo-
gy attempted to reduce all psychological phenomena
to the most elementary processes. Contemporary re-
ductionism generally seeks to phrase psychological
problems in stimulus-response terms and to reduce
these further to physiological or even psychochemi-
cal terms.
Redundancy
A term from information theory that describes quan-
titatively the possible abbreviation of a sequence of
symbols when using an optimal coding, and the same re-
pertoire of symbols. The redundancy of a code allows
transmission of information to take place without dis-
turbance. Without reducdancy, an error in transmission
of code elements always loads to the coding of ano-
ther symbol and consequently cannot be discovered. Re-
dundancy can.be used to' discover
,
locate and even co-
rrect errors. The redundancy of human speech, which is
relatively secure against disturbance, stands at 0.7 -
0.8. The disadvantage of redundancy in the discovery
and correction of errors is that the length of the co-
de words increases with the degree of redundancy and
safety from disturbance.
R e g i o , n
Broadly defined, a region is a general area or space.
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As a topological concept, region is any distingui-
shable part of the life space. Psychological regions
are defined by present or contemplated activities ra-
'
ther than by objective spatial areas in which activi-
ties occur. For example, a child using a porch as a
stage is in the region of "play acting" rather than
in the region of the "porch".
It is important to point out that regions are se-
parated by boundaries. When a person changes activi-
ties, he moves from one region to another across a
boundary, in Lewin'sfield theory, region is connected
with the concept of life space, the totality of the
individual existing in his perceived environment at
any given time.
Response
Any kind of behavior, psychological event, or reac-
tion produced by a stimulus. A response is determined
either directly by its physiological activity ( move-
ment, glandular activity, etc. ) or indirectly by its
effect ( e.g.
,
tears after an insult ) , or not overtly
at all ( images or fahtasies, which are reportable on-
ly by experiencing person himself ) . In the pharmaco-
logical sense, a measurable change in the organism re-
sulting from intake of a drug.
S ( plural Ss )
Subject in a experiment.
Sampling tachniques
The sampliitf technique determines the extent to which
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meauuremts made of the sample hold good for the po-pulation as a whole. Greater accuracy can always be
achreved by increasing the size of the random sample.
owever, to obtain twice the degree of accuracy, itis necessary to quadruple the size of the sample; choi-
ce of the sampling technique is therefore determined
some extend by cost. A distinction can be made bet-
ween sampling techniques based on the principle of ran-dom sampling
( probability sampling ) and those based
on non-random ( non-probability ) sampling
.Non-random
samples are generally chosen by experts using their ownjudgment, while in the case of random sampler, there is
a known probability for each element of the population
included in the sample. Although it is conceivable that
more accurate results may be obtained by non-random
sampling, this is not generally confirmed by practical
experience; the decisive factor, however, is that an
indication of the accuracy of results can only be ob-
tained in the case of random selection.
The random methods can be divided into simple, li-
mited and multistage categories. In the sample method
every element of the population has the ame likehood
of being included in the sample. The choice can be ma
de by drawing lots or by simulation with random num-
bers. Simple random samples are also sometimes under-
stood to constitute systematic selection, in which ca-
se individuals are selected at given intervals from a
list of total population elements. The most important
techniques using limited random selection are those of
the stratified sample and the cluster sample.
In the stratified sample the basic population is di-
vided into strata which must be as homogeneous as po-
ssible; selection is then affected on a strictly ran-
dom basis within the individual strata. The size ofthe sample selected from each stratum must be pro-portionaly representative of the size of the stratumm relation to the basic population; if it is repre-
sentative we speak of a proportional sample. In a clus-ter sample we refer to groupings already present in the
population ( e.g., school classes, houses, towns, which
must be as non-homogeneous as possible. Random clus-
ters are then and used as the sample. By comparison with
pure random samples, stratified samples result in an in-
crease in accuracy that becomes more susbstantial as the
strata become more homogeneous and are more clearly se-
parated from each other. On the other hand, the cluster
method is less accurate than the purely random procedu-
re. The greater the lack of homogeneity in the composi-
tion of the clusters and the smaller the differences
between individual clusters, the smaller the reduction
m accuracy. The cluster method is characterized by low
sampling costs. Multistage sampling generally takes the
form of a sequence of cluster selections, e.g. villages
may be selected first and individual houses then chosen
at random within the villages. Stratified and cluster me
thods may also be combined. In non-random sampling, the
quota method plays an important part, since it is succe-
ssfully used by opinion research institutes. Each inter-
viwer is required to question a number ( quota ) of in-
dividuals having selected characteristics denoted by a
given code, e.g., a specific number of persons of a par-
ticular sex with specific income level and political atti-
tudes, etc. The quotas are determined proportionately to
the structure of the population as a whole, to the ex-
tent that this is known. The quota method therefore has
some similarity to the stratified sampling technique,
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with the important difference that within the quotas,
ples
Ct
f°
n 13 t0 ^ Ski11 ° f thS interviwer
- Exam-
P o common errors are: that more intelligent personstend to be consulted because they can be expected to ans-wer e questions more quickly, and that telephone subs-
cribers tend to be chosen because it is easier to con-tact them in advance and so avoid any loss of time, etc
ue to these distortions, quota sampling cannot be class-tied as a random method. A further type of non-random
sampling is frequently used for preliminary studies wher (
a " sample may be taken simply because it is easily access:
ble, e.g., students at an institute of psychology may be
subjects. This method is known as opportunity sar
pling. It is not really possible to generalize from the
results achieved ( Cochran, 1953 )
S c i e nee
The study of natural phenomena by the methods of the
physical and biological sciences. This usage, while com-
mon, arbitrarily excludes most investigations and sys-
tematizations of knowledge in the psychological and so-
cial disciplines. Such division is unwarranted in the
light of both historical development and contemporary
affairs, and it gives to science as expressed in the En-
glish language a narrow connotation than that of related
expressions in other European languages.
Scientific method
The systematic statement of the general principles and
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precepts ( found in all the sciences and in all sound
investigation and thinking, whether or not specifica-
lly considered scientific ) that deal with the syste-
matic, accurate observation of facts and their permi-
ssible interpretation.
—
c ienti fic psychology
Any psychological system that concerns itself with
the search for facts or that utilizes scientific me-
thods. Scientific psychology is often contrasted with
speculative psychology; but all science ( not only psy-
chology ) necessarily includes speculation. Scientific
and philosophical psychology can properly be contras-
ted, but the latter is so little discussed that this is
seldom the contrast implied. Since virtually all pre-
sent-day psychology is scientific in orientation, the
term has little value.
Stimulus
The cause of a response. Energy, or change in ener-
gy in the environment that is perceived through any
receptor, internal or -external, and that produces a res-
ponse. Anything to which the organism responds; it may
be as specific as the prick of a needle or as general
as a seascape.
Structure
The term has proved adaptable to many uses - one
speaks of the structure of the atom, the structure of
a sentence, the structure of a bodily organ, mental struc-
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tures, the structure of society. The use of structu-
re in connection with buildings and the like gives the
term an overtone of strength. Structure is contrasted
with function or process ( though these may themselves
have structure ) , with the formless, and with the tempo-
rary or rapidly changing. Structure usually implies
stability of the component .parts
,
wheras the parts of
Gestalt or of a system may alter so long as the interre-
lationships remain the same. Gestalt emphasizes wholness;
system emphasizes rationality of arrangement of parts
according to their role or function. But these distinc-
tions are not rigid and the four terms are often inter-
changeable.
Symmetry
The property of having similar, equal, or parallel
form or character on both sides of a dividing line ( bi-
lateral symmetry ); or by extension, at regular inter-
vals about a center ( radial symmetry ) . Used litera-
lly for spatial distributions, or metaphorically for any
kind of relationship, e.g. the equality relation ( x=y)
in mathematics is symmetrical.
Taxonomy
The classification of data according to their natu-
ral relationships or the principles governing such cla-
ssification .
Theory
In philosophy, a construct, deduced logically by the
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intelligence and isolated from action; a consistentgroup of concepts and statements derived from prin-
ciples, built up methdologically and systematically
and detached from their application. In science, lls
expressed in a systematiciform, which are based on ob-servation and remain true until they are superseded
y new data; they are therefore dependent on a speci-
1C state of knowledge. The purpose of a theory is not
only to explain that which is known but to forecast
the unknown. In the narrower sense, a theory is a sys-tem of axiomatic mathematical statements that serves
as a model for a set of empirical laws ( hypothetico-
deductive theory ). Examples: theory of reminiscence,
theory of relativity.
Universe
In statistics the total group under consideration
m study or experiment from which samples are drawn. So
me statiscal writers distinguish between universe and
population by referring to the population as "collec-
tions of real persons or objects" and the universe as
hypothetical grouping or accumulation of data ( tests,
scores
,
etc. ) ( Diamond, 1959; CTTool, 1964 ).
Variability
The divergence or scatter from trait to trait within
the individual obtained by having him take a number of
tests, scoring these on a common scale, and computing
the variability of the scores around the mean of the
tests
.
169Validity
The quality of being strong or well grounded; theproperty of being legitimately derived from premises
by logical inference. The degree to which a test ac-
tually measures what it was designed to measure. The
validity correlation or coefficient ( ry ) is the co-rrelation between scores on a measurement instrument
and the criterion scores that that instrument is suppo
sed to measure.
Other than construct validity and predictive validi-
ty, which are defined separately in their proper alpha-
betical listings, there are other types of validity
usually associated with validation tests. Content vali-
dity of a tests is determined by systematically analy-
zing samples of the test items to assure that adequa-
te coverage and representation of the items ( such as
word for a spelling test or history items for a histo-
ry test ) are made. Content validity is used frequent-
ly in the evaluation of achievement tests. Empirical
( true ) validity demonstrates the relation between test
scores and a criterion ( which is an independent and
direct measure of that characteristic or quality the
test is designed to predict ) . Such validation must com
two sets of data ( for example, tests scores and
criterion measures ) on the same person. Factorial va-
lidity expresses correlation between the test under
consideration and the factor (s) common to a group of
tests or other measures of behavior, as determined by
the statistical technique of factor analysis (Hays,
1964; Cronbach, 1970 ).
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1 i j 1 t y (ecological)
An established relationship ( within a given ha-
bitat or sot of environmental circumstances ) between
a proximal sensory impact a distal variable in the mo-
re remote environment, such that the presence of the
proximal stimulus implies a strong probability that the
distal stimulus is operative and vice versa. For exam-
ple if there is a certain small image on the retina
( a proximal stimulus ) , it is probable that there is
an object in the environment ( a distal stimulus ) some
what like the image.
V a r j a nee
A quantity that may increase or decrease, continuous-
ly or discontinuously
,
without other essential change,
e.g., the area of skin stimulated, the intensity of the
stimulus, the number of correct answers on a test, the
time taken to react. Note that it is the area which is
the variable, not the skin itself; the intensity, not
the stimulus; the number not the correct answer; the ti-
me, not the reaction. In this sense, a variable is al-
ways an abstraction, a quantity.
Variable refers also to the actual quantities that
constitute data; trait refers to that to which the da-
ta are assigned. Thus, trait suggests an entity, varia-
ble does not. In psychology three classes of variables
are distinguished: R variables, responses or acts; S va-
riables, properties of the physical or social environ-
ment; 0 variables, the organic or organismic or perso-
nal variables, the changeable properties of the person
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or organism. The R variable is always the dependent
variable. See "measurement".
Zero
Referring to a correlation coefficient computed
from the original data; thus, the correlation having
no variables held constant. The ordinary correlation
r
12 1S a zero order one, in contrast with a partial
correlation of the first order r
±2 3 which has one va
riable, 3, held constant; or with one of the second
order r
12 . 34 which has two variables, 3 and 4, held
constant.
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